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PLATO, ART AND MR. MARITAIN

THE purpose of this article is to restate the fundamental teaching of Plato (with some reference to Aristotle) on art and beauty, and to show, chiefly by reference to Maritain's *Art and Scholasticism* (English translation by J. F. Scanlan, 1930 edition), how a right understanding of Plato might be of use—at least for the purpose of illustration—to those who wish to construct an aesthetic on the basis of Scholasticism.

A slight but convenient outline of Plato's views on art is to be found in his *Gorgias* 503-4. The first portion of the passage may be summarized thus: painters and all other craftsmen select their materials with great care so that the thing which they make may have a definite "form"; to this end they compel its parts to harmonize with one another; hence what they construct is an ordered whole.

The "theory of Ideas" is not expounded in the *Gorgias*; and the word "form" or "idea" is used without any particular metaphysical implications. But since the examples which Plato here gives of the successful attainment of 'form', include good health and a virtuous soul as well as a good house or painting or ship, it is clear that "form" means not merely outer form or shape, but an inner and purposive arrangement and modification of selected matter. Thus, while the passage

is in harmony with Plato's (later?) doctrine of "forms" ("ideas") as existing outside concrete reality, it is also in harmony with the Aristotelian doctrine of matter and form It has, therefore, an evident affinity not only with St. Augustine's definition of beauty as *splendor ordinis*, but also with the scholastic "splendour of form . . . shining upon the proportioned parts of matter" (quoted by Maritain, p. 25). Elsewhere Plato defines beauty as harmonious arrangement, the proportion of parts to each other and to the whole (*Hipp. Maj.* 293 e); and this is said to be the same thing as measure and symmetry (*Phileb.* 64 e). Thus order, i. e. unity in variety, is characteristic of the successful work of art. Further, the unity must be of a special kind: it is organic rather than artificial, resembling the unity of a living creature (*Phaedr.* 264 c) in which there is no part which does not subserve the whole; and that the variety as well as the unity may be perceptible, the whole must be of a proper magnitude (*ibid.* 267 b). Whence comes this unity, this quasi-animation of the work of art? From the *Gorgias* above cited we have learned the essence of Plato's answer: that it comes from the form. The same passage implies that the form is an intelligible; the artists there described are working intelligently, according to a grammar or logic of art imposed upon them by the end which they have in view (the artefact). The distinctive mark of an art (e. g., of oratory as opposed to mere random talking) is the clear articulation of the parts (e. g. of an argument), which cannot be attained otherwise than by the comprehension of particulars under one idea (cf. *Phaedr.* 265-6). It is clear that the creation and appreciation of beauty are, in the main, intellectual processes; for beauty and genuine pleasure in beauty are bound up with law and order and truth (*Rep.* 585-8).

All this appears to be in accord with sound scholastic doctrine. It is the intellect which supplies the formal element of the work of art, controlling and directing matter to the end proposed

(Maritain p. 7). The artist impresses on matter a form or idea which (whatever else Plato may say about it) is present to his mind (p. 9). His work is marked by due magnitude, wholeness, proportion of parts. But these qualities flow from its intelligibility. They have, as Maritain says (p. 28) "no absolute significance" save as tending to the end of the work, which is the manifestation of a form in matter. Since form is essentially intelligible (though not necessarily intelligible to us) one may conclude from what I have said so far, that for Plato as for Mr. Maritain genuine art is somehow in contact with "the intelligible world" (p. 23).

Let me turn for a moment to the Platonic definitions of beauty by its effects. Some of these are suggestive, though inadequately discussed by Plato; and it is important that they be not misunderstood. If the beautiful is the useful (*Hipp. Maj.* 295 c ff., cf. *Rep.* 341 d, 457 b), it is nevertheless clear that Plato is not to be accused of utilitarianism. For he does not identify usefulness with the performance of purely practical functions. If he is concerned with "advantage" it is with the advantage of the soul. Later it will be necessary to mention some of the functions which Plato attributes to beautiful works. Meanwhile be it noted that Maritain finds a similar "utility" in art, even in the "fine arts" which he contrasts with the "useful." He explains that "art teaches men the pleasures of the spirit" (p. 80); and so it is a "necessity in the human state" for, as St. Thomas says, "if a man is deprived of the pleasures of the spirit he goes over to the pleasures of the flesh." Nor does art merely purvey a spiritual pleasure; it is "able to lead men to what is nobler than itself" (*ibid.*). Here is a point of view from which it is easy to sympathize with Plato's treatment (in *Rep.* III) of the propaedeutic value or utility of art.

Again, it is suggested that the beautiful may be "that which gives pleasure through the medium of hearing and sight"

(*Hipp. Maj.* 298 a); or that it has the quality of "causing the beholders to rejoice" (*Gorg.* 474). The association of beauty with the two senses which are *maxime cognoscitivi* would itself suggest the intellectuality of art and of artistic appreciation (cf. Maritain p. 23). But of greater interest is the bearing of these definitions upon the famous dictum of St. Thomas that beauty is *id quod visum placet.* The thing seen pleases—*what* does it please? Merely the eye, the sense of sight (and the intellect only to the degree of whatever embryonic intellection is bound up in every sense-perception)? Mr. Maritain's distinctive interpretation (as I understand it) is to the effect that the beautiful thing which we see or otherwise intuit through the senses, pleases not merely the sense but the whole man in his quality as *animal rationale.* The beauty connatural to man is "that which delights the mind through the senses and their intuition" (p. 24); and "there can be no beauty unless" not merely the senses or imagination but "the mind also is in some way rejoiced" (p. 25). Plato manages to say what Maritain considers St. Thomas to have meant. Beauty gives pleasure (Plato says) not to sight but "through the medium of sight"; and it causes to rejoice not the eyes but "the beholders." I am not suggesting that Plato's remarks have any great argumentative value for fixing St. Thomas's meaning. But at least they might have served Maritain as useful support and illustration. For Plato at least, the pleasure afforded by genuine art and beauty is an intellectual pleasure. Thus in *Laws* 658-9 in admitting that pleasure will serve as a criterion of artistic merit, he declares that it must be the pleasure of the enlightened which will so serve, i. e., not a mere sensual or emotional pleasure.

According to Plato, then, art and beauty are related to the intelligible world. What is the nature of that relationship? Many writers have misled themselves (by hastily reading a portion of the tenth book of the *Republic* and ignoring the rest of

the dialogue) into denying that any such relationship exists according to Plato. It is unfortunate that Maritain has been in turn misled by such writers, and quarrels with Plato on the ground that he criticized art as "a means of knowledge" and condemned poetry "as an illusion" (p. 56). The rest of this essay will be chiefly concerned with dissipating this misconception.[1]

The renewed discussion of poetry and art in *Rep.* X apparently treats the products of art as "twice-removed" from reality (i. e. the ideal world) on the ground that they are mere imitations of concrete particulars, which themselves are mere imitations of reality. Yet it is plain even from this book that poetry as such is not expelled from the ideal state, that genuine art is once-removed (not twice) from the ideal world (607 a, 599 d), and that the new discussion in *Rep.* X is strictly subordinate to the earlier treatment of poetry in Books II and III.

Maritain (p. 56) speaks of Plato's "contempt for poetry." Yet Plato desires the presence of poets and poetry in his ideal state, and finds poetry, and art in general, valuable in many ways. In particular, the style of this ideal poetry will 'imitate' (express, manifest) the qualities proper to the character of 'guardian', and therefore — since we become like what we imitate, and imitate what we admire—will induce and confirm these qualities in the souls of young and old. Poetry and all other forms of art will train the young to love and to imitate (resemble) the beauty of truth and reason, with the result that when reason develops in them, they will recognize it as an old friend (*Rep.* III 392 c ff., 402). The doctrine is summarized

[1] In discussing the artistic imitation of forms or ideas, I have made some use of my articles "'Imitation' in Plato's *Republic*" (*Classical Quarterly*, Jany. 1928), "Plato and 'Imitation'" (*ibid.*, Oct. 1932), "On Plato: *Laws* X 889 cd" (*ibid.*, Apr. 1936). Lest it be thought that I am reading Maritain into Plato, it should be added that my views on Plato had been formed (and, in part, published) before I read anything of Maritain.

in VIII (558): unless a man has natural gifts beyond the ordinary, he could never become a good man unless from boyhood onwards he plays among beautiful things and follows beautiful practices. Plato, like Maritain, regards artistic pleasure as a necessity of human life. See, for example, *Philebus* 62 cd, where all sciences and arts (including the literary arts) are admitted into the good life as necessary if human life is to be life at all. Clearly there is something wrong with an interpretation of Plato which accuses him of "contempt for poetry."

The misconception is due to the ambiguity of the Greek words meaning "imitate", etc. The ambiguity will be clear to any one who compares certain passages of Book III (e. g. 397 d, 398 b), according to which the poetry retained in the ideal state is "imitative," with the beginning of Book X which, recalling the conclusion of the earlier discussion, declares that entrance to the ideal state was refused to "so much of poetry as is imitative"—a statement which implies that not all poetry is "imitative" in the sense in which the word is here used. Again, Book X, though rejecting all "imitative" poetry, nevertheless retains two very wide classes of poetry: hymns to the gods and eulogies on good men; and these are "imitative" because they imitate or represent the characters of gods and heroes (604 c, etc.). By ignoring such verbal inconsistencies it has come to be assumed that since art is, for Plato, imitative, and since *Rep.* X excludes all imitative "making" from the ideal state, it follows that Plato is to be classed with the strict Mohammedans and the Buddhists who "repudiated all art" (Tolstoi, *On Art*, c. V). This assumption is ludicrous.

The solution to the verbal puzzles is a simple one. The ordinary literal sense of 'imitation' in Greek (as to some extent also in English) tends to imply the notion of a fake, sham, counterfeit; and as applied to art the term naturally referred to the outward and deceptive resemblance between a work of

art and the material object represented. Plato saw no merit in the art which copies mere externals, however technically efficient it might be. The "showy facade" of scene-painting (*Rep.* 365 c) provides him more than once with emphatic terms for condemning the pretensions of hypocrisy or the deceptiveness of mere "opinion" divorced from knowledge (of which opinion is a mere imitation). Maritain similarly dislikes the illusionistic; he quotes with approval Rodin's saying: "the ugly in art is the fake" (p. 52). This is what Plato is saying in *Rep.* X where he excludes from his ideal state the art which is content to hold the mirror up to the material world; the art which merely copies sensible objects, and copies them, furthermore, not as they are, but as they appear; the poetry, for example, which, if it imitates or represents the character of a physician, does so by a mere sprinkling of medical terms which the poet does not understand (599 c). The aim of such art is to delight and deceive the senses of the childish and thoughtless (as Zeuxis' grapes deceived the birds); and hence it claims to be judged by mere sensual or emotional pleasure and false opinion (cf. *Laws* 667 ff.). It is the work not of those who know but of those who pose as knowing. These "imitative" artists see no meaning in things, read no meaning in the world about them; they are content to reproduce mere external appearances. The characteristic of such artists is their utter lack of all contact with "the intelligible world."

These are the artists who are condemned in the third book of the *Republic* also, who, imitating almost wholly by sounds and postures, reproduce anything and everything, thunder, wind, hail, trumpets, the barks of dogs, the bleating of sheep (396-7), and whose work, true offspring of an evil and ignorant character of soul, is marked by the absence of genuine grace, rhythm and harmony (i. e., of form and intelligibility) (401). Is Plato wrong in condemning this kind of alleged art, which lacks form and the qualities which result only from a grasp of

form, and which aims at a purely non-intellectual (and therefore non-genuine) pleasure? He is not wrong according to Aristotle, who requires that a genuinely artistic picture should give the intellectual pleasure of recognition—a pleasure which cannot be achieved by laying on a mass of beautiful colours. (One may note that according to this passage, *Poet.* 1450 b 1, it is implied that the picture should be both like and unlike the object depicted; it should surpass the concrete reality as in 1454 b 10 and 1461 b 13.) Nor is Plato wrong according to Maritain, who says (p. 39) that, without intellectual form, "art would be a mere sensual confusion." It is, as we have seen, just this "mere sensual confusion" which is condemned by Plato in *Rep.* III as in *Rep.* X.

But the term "imitation" (mimesis and cognates) is also used by Plato in a metaphorical sense to mean the expression or manifestation of what is intelligible and invisible. Thus the poetry which Plato desires to have in his ideal state is "unmixed" i. e., free from *literal* imitation (mere external copying or miming), and yet "imitative of the virtuous character" (*Rep.* 397 d), i. e. imitative in the transferred sense of expressing by means of material sights and sounds, not the external appearance of the virtuous man (his stoop or his stammer, as the case may be, to borrow an apt illustration from Plutarch's *De Aud. Poet.*) but the inward quality, inaudible, invisible, intangible and inexhaustible, of virtue and knowledge. The ideal artist should be able to "search out the nature of the beautiful" and "stamp the image of the good upon his works" (*Rep.* 401). That is to say (for I have no scruple in understanding this passage in the light of the theory of forms or ideas which is expounded later in the dialogue) the genuine artist detects these "forms" in or through material nature, and shows us how to read the world by exhibiting them in his own works with a clarity greater than is to be found in the concrete particular objects which he represents. Thus the artist

"discriminates form" (I borrow this phrase from E. I. Watkin's illuminating book *A Philosophy of Form*)—form somehow "present" in matter, and re-embodies it for our intellectual (not excluding sub-intellectual) delight. This intuition of form is, of course, an intellectual process; for form or idea, being purely intelligible, escapes the grasp of sensation. The work of producing an "imitation" of invisible, intelligible form is also intellectual. The world about us represents the artistry of God; it is an imitation or manifestation of "the intelligible world," because it is fashioned by Reason (cf. *Rep.* X, *Laws* X, *Phaedo* 73 ff.). Human artistry should imitate the divine; it "continues" the divine creation (Maritain, p. 63). It is because of the divine artistry that our human reason can discover the intelligibles—forms or ideas—"present" in material nature; for they are really there. Thus the artist must make form (idea) present in his works, so as to produce a copy or manifestation which is only once, not twice, removed, of the intelligible world. We may ignore the fact that Plato appears to take the substantial reality out of things and place it outside them in a separate world of ideas. The important point is that man as a rational being can be led by sensibles to grasp intelligibles (he is "reminded" of the latter by the former, *Phaedo* 74 bc) which he can thereafter embody in artistic productions. Hence for Plato as for Maritain the genuine artist is "an Intellectual operating" (p. 20); his work is the "manifestation of form," which Plato calls by a metaphor "imitation"; and because it in some sort expresses the ideal in sensible sound and shape it is "symbolic" in the sense in which Maritain uses that word (p. 57). For the form which art imitates is, according to Plato, "made by God," and, according to Maritain, "a remnant or ray of the Creative Mind impressed upon the heart of the being created" (p. 25). Thus in the case of the arts which we call "representative," if they be genuine arts, they will not only recall the physical appearance of their "re-

mote material" (the concrete object) but will manifest whatever "forms" the material suggests to the mind of the artist. The art is not genuine if it is literally imitative, i. e., enslaved to the material objects which it portrays.

The works of art of which Plato approves are thus inspired by some sort of contact with the intelligible world. It is however, commonly denied that Plato envisaged an art which could "imitate" the ideas. I have always found this denial incomprehensible. Consider not only the passages to which I have above referred but also the character of the ideal artist as the *Republic* paints it. He must be a good man (369 bc, 400 de); but on Platonic principles he cannot be good unless he understands the principles of goodness; hence (401, 402 c) he perceives the forms of all the virtues and recognizes them wherever they are to be found, whether imaged in things great or in things small. Whether engaged in dramatic composition (396) or in any other kind of artistic production (401), he must produce "things akin to, and *imitative* of, the good and temperate character" proper to himself and to those for whom he creates. That particular kind of artist who is to practise the art of law-making is described without any ambiguity in *Rep.* VI 500 c ff. as "*imitating*" *the ideal world* both in the beauty and orderliness of his own character, and in the virtuous institutions which he introduces among mankind (cf. also 540 a). Here we have a detailed description of the method of working adopted by the philosophic statesman. Like the genuine painter he uses "the divine paradigm" (500 e, the divine pattern is the world of ideas; and be it noted that since a paradigm is for imitating and not for eating, and since "imitation" is the word actually used of the philosopher's relation to the ideal world, this passage, combined with 400-402 is a very ample answer to those who say that the only sense of "imitation" (mimesis) in the *Republic* is that of dramatic impersonation.) His canvas is a city-state and human nature. First

he makes his canvas clean; next he sketches the outline of his polity; and then he fills in the outline by dint of looking now at the forms (ideas) of justice, beauty, virtue, etc., now at his picture, until by mixing together various institutions he produces the colour and likeness of true manhood. In forming his conception of true manhood he will be assisted by contemplating those concrete personalities among mankind who are marked by a quality which even Homer called godly and godlike (501 b). After much rubbing out and painting in he finally satisfies himself by producing " a very beautiful picture." It could hardly be made plainer that the genuine law-maker and the genuine painter have a footing in two worlds, the material and the ideal. Their work bears the stamp of the intelligible world; but to that intelligibility they were first led, at least in part, by contemplating " form " visibly present in concrete reality. In depicting e. g. the likeness of true manhood it imitates not the material and individual existing objects (men) alone, or the ideas alone, but ideas plus object; the object being " the remote matter " (Maritain p. 58) and the ideas supplying the formal element of imitation thanks to which the whole process is pervaded by the controlling power of mind over matter (cf. p. 129).

Further, unless the ideal world were, in Plato's view, expressed in some degree by beautiful works of art, why should Plato lay such stress on the importance of an artistically beautiful environment for the young who have not yet reached the age of reason? Inured to beautiful things from their earliest years, they will, when reason develops, recognize it as an old friend (402 a). How could they *recognize* reason, if reason is not in some way immanent in the beautiful products of all the arts and crafts with which they are to be surrounded? We may conclude then that according to the *Republic* itself (to say nothing of the testimony of other dialogues) genuine art, in Plato's view, " imitates," i. e. manifests, the ideal world, and

is thus but once-removed from what Plato calls reality and nature. It must of course be remembered that for Plato the real is the ideal or intelligible—a fact which Maritain appears to ignore when he says (p. 56) that Plato allots to art as its essential end the representation of the real. He means, I suppose, that Plato conceives art as always and necessarily holding the mirror up to nature. But this is the very conception of art which Plato is at pains to discard along with what seemed to him to be its products. That a different brand of art is at least possible Plato clearly teaches. Otherwise it would be impossible for the ideal state to have any art at all, and equally impossible for it to set on art a value so high as Plato indicates in *Rep.* III and elsewhere.

The remarks on art in the passage of the *Gorgias* with which I began, are intended to enforce an analogy between the good house, the sound body and the healthy soul: all three are characterized by order and arrangement. In the *Republic* the relationship between art and justice is more than an analogy. Since justice, whether in the individual or in society, means "harmony," which is attainable only when reason rules, and since art is to be characterized by "grace, rhythm and harmony," the psychological effect of good art is to prepare the soul for the rule of reason, which is the source of order in every sphere. That reason should have its due rights in religion, art, law, ethics and every other form of human activity is a theme on which Plato never tires of laying stress. It is reason which delineates the sphere inside which any particular art is free to pursue the perfection of its own works; and in this sense W. Pater was indeed right in finding the principle of "art for art's sake" in the *Republic*. It is reason which gives those works that value which commends them to the builder of an ideal state. Plato's concern with art is to reform and vindicate it in the face of its traducers and its false friends. This concern is exactly what we should expect when we consider how

much Plato wrote in answer to the specious distinction between "law" or "art" on the one hand and "nature" on the other, which was exploited by shallow thinkers in the fifth and fourth centuries B. C. It was inferred that the distinction between right and wrong was "unnatural," "artificial"; that law, justice, and civilization generally, were based on "conventions" which had no roots in the nature of reality. Against this doctrine Plato contends that reason is natural; it inheres in God, in man, in the universe; and its nature is to rule by law. The rule of reason is natural, healthy, just; it means happiness and harmony in the individual and peace and order in society. For man to deny his rational nature and submit to the rule of material impulses is unnatural; it means sickness of soul and the corruption of social life. The antithesis between law and nature, together with the sophistic deductions drawn from it, breaks down in so far as law is (as it should be) based on reason. The ideal thing—but it is an impracticable ideal—is to be ruled by reason without the help of written laws. But laws become necessary in so far as the ideally wise rulers are not actually available—either at all or in sufficient numbers—and in so far as mankind is incompletely permeable by reason. All that the lawgiver can do then is to see to it that his laws *imitate with knowledge and art* the ideal constitution which is superior to written enactments. Such is the doctrine of the *Politicus* 297-306. *Without* knowledge, his imitation will be of the literal "twice-removed" variety, which means chaos in the state, save where Providence directly intervenes lest a society should perish utterly. *With* knowledge, his laws will be a metaphorical, "once-removed" imitation (manifestation) of the intelligible world. Adapted to local circumstances and human materials, they will nevertheless reflect "the divine paradigm." Hence *the lawgiver is an artist in just the same way as the poet and the painter.* And this is the reason why, when Plato writes of poetry or painting or other arts, the art of *lawmaking*

is never absent from his mind. The kinship of these arts is so marked in Plato that one can only feel surprise that those who have written on Plato's view of art have omitted to make his views on the art of lawmaking a touchstone for the views which they have attributed to him on poetry and painting. If it were true, for example, that Plato "repudiated all art," why, then the Republic of Plato would have no laws, no constitution.

Plato justifies the art of lawmaking (as he himself practised it) on the lines which I have just indicated. But in vindicating this art he vindicates all genuine art; for, as he himself is aware, all the genuine arts are akin inasmuch as they "imitate" the ideal realm. I have already made use of *Rep.* 500-1 where the kinship of the genuine arts of lawmaking and painting is so admirably expressed. Another striking passage to the same effect is *Laws* 817, where the term "imitation" is applied to Plato's own work in depicting the lineaments of an ideal state. Here it is the kinship with poetry which is emphasized. The lawmaker is not only a painter but a tragic poet; for genuine tragedy (like lawmaking and painting) is an "imitation" (i. e., an expression in concrete materials) of "the best and noblest life." If tragedy fails to "imitate" that idea or ideal, it is not genuine tragedy and must be refused entrance into the state. Many other passages illustrate the fact that for Plato all the arts—law-making, poetry and the rest—are akin, precisely because they must all "stamp the image of the good" upon their works, and because this is impossible save in so far as the artist (whatever his genre) sees and imitates not merely material nature but the intelligibles which transcend it and are nevertheless immanent in it. We have seen that in the passage of the *Gorgias* already cited, beauty means order and arrangement whether the beautiful thing be a good house or a soul marked by *law* and justice. Similarly in the *Symposium* 209 the lawmaking of Solon and Lycurgus is commended as no less beautiful (in the exoteric sense) than the poetry of Homer and

Hesiod; and the genuine lover of beauty (destined to be initiated into the deepest mysteries of Absolute Beauty) as he climbs through various stages towards his goal, passes through one stage at which he contemplates the beauty of *laws* and institutions (210-211). Their beauty is mentioned also in *Hipp. Maj.* 295 d and *Gorg.* 474 de. But there is no need to multiply references. The most noteworthy passage of all is the vindication of "*art and law*" in *Laws* X with its noble moral that "art and law exist by nature or are even more real than nature since they are *products of mind*" (890 d).

It would seem that no one except myself has thought it worth while to observe that the argument which Plato's *opponents* in *Laws* X bring against art and law in general is significantly similar to the argument which Plato himself ("the Platonic Socrates" of the *Republic* is demonstrably Plato) uses in *Rep.* X in order to dispose of art which is imitative in the literal sense of merely holding up the mirror to material nature. According to the atheists of the *Laws,* art is twice-removed from material nature, which they regard as the sole reality. Its generative activity is a mere "imitative" aping of the generative powers which they describe as inherent (though they apparently feel no need to ask why they are inherent) in matter. Nature made man; and man by a freakish and inexplicable fiction made the gods and justice. The products of art, including the art of lawmaking, are thus mere "playthings," "shadowy copies" of natural products, which in turn owe their existence to "nature and chance, no thanks to God or any mind or art." The art of the statesman is invalid save in so far as it expresses the "natural" law that might is right. Plato uses the same expressions of the literally imitative arts in *Rep.* X: these alleged arts are mere "playthings," "remote from nature" (i. e., ideal reality), producing mere "shadowy copies" of copies of nature. Evidently he is using in *Rep.* X the argument, and perhaps even the vocabulary, of his opponents for

their own discomfiture. The fashionable materialism (taught by both poets and prose-writers) had condemned art and law as opposed to nature, and taught that the best life is that which is "right according to nature," so that we may, if we are able, live without scruple the life of the strong man (the "superman") or, if too feeble, follow the hypocritical course of upholding "justice" as a conventional fiction which may serve our convenience. In *Rep.* X Plato is retorting to these pseudo-philosophers that their view of art and law as remote from nature is perfectly true of the only kind of art which is possible if their principles are accepted. That is to say, if art is capable of nothing save producing insubstantial copies of material nature, then it is twice-removed from nature in the true sense of the word "nature" (the intelligible world). The irony of the situation is increased by the fact that some at least of his opponents are poets. Plato means that his accusation is true of the art and poetry which have no basis in the ideal realm, which in fact ignore (or deny) the existence and validity of reason, and which are the work of men ignorant of, and therefore unable to express, *intelligible* reality. It is true of the art which represents the superficial appearance of things and cannot manifest ("imitate" in the metaphorical sense) their inner form or meaning. Those who exclude form (ideality, intelligibility, design, art) from nature do not know what "nature" means: by ignoring form they cut themselves off from reason; their poetry and art, if consistent with their philosophy, will be a sensual and emotional orgy, false, meaningless, pernicious. The material world is permeated by reason and divine law. Human law too (as Plato explains in the *Laws*) should be the "dispensation of reason." How deeply art of all kinds is involved in this answer to the materialists, I have already explained. Poetry and painting and all the arts and crafts are also "dispensations of reason"; for they are primarily the work of mind. If they fail to be the work of mind they are but

counterfeits of genuine art, "pretenders deceiving and self-deceived." The genuine artist will imitate ("so far as is possible for a man") the artistic activity of God; for what the materialists call nature is not primary but fashioned by the "art" of the Supreme Soul (*Laws* 892 b, 896 e). As God (Who is Supreme Truth and Reason) makes law and art immanent in material nature, so man as a rational being must make law and art immanent in his own life and social environment (*Rep.* 500 cd).

The reason for my dwelling on this association of art with mind and reason in Plato is that this is the point on which Plato's doctrine of art has been fundamentally misunderstood in modern times. The misunderstanding appears to me to date from the rise of humanism and to have been strengthened by the Romantic movement. I do not find it in the Neoplatonists; and I imagine that it does not occur in the mediaeval writers who, not unacquainted with Plato, make some mention of art. It is worth while to observe that Maritain's position is in essential agreement with Plato's; and that although Maritain misconceives (through no fault of his own, as I have explained) Plato's view of art, he nevertheless conciously or unconciously repeats Plato's views, sometimes even with verbal similarity. See for example p. 96: "what art makes must resemble not the material appearance of things but some one of the hidden significances whose iris God alone sees glittering on the neck of His creatures." Or p. 64: material nature is "not a model to be slavishly copied." Or p. 135: the artist's contribution to human life should be "nourishment and not intoxication only."

To say with Plato and Mr. Maritain that it is the proper function of art to manifest form (idea) is to lay oneself open to a misunderstanding. The Romantic will complain that this means making art into an instrument of knowledge; the textbook logician will ask what kind of "universal" can art "imi-

tate," and demand that we *define* the concepts embodied in any given artefact. Maritain has been so misunderstood in spite of his explanation (p. 28, n. 1) that "by *brilliance of form* must be understood an *ontological* splendour . . . not a conceptual clarity." The irony of the situation is that he himself misunderstands Plato in the same way, accusing Plato of criticizing art as "a means of knowledge" and as inferior in that respect to geometry (p. 56).

The accusation is unfair. Plato, as we have seen, attaches the greatest importance to the early education of the young in beauty. But this acquisition of a love for things beautiful imparts (he says) "*not knowledge* but a kind of harmoniousness by means of harmony" etc. (*Rep.* VIII 522 a). How could art impart *knowledge* to those who have not yet arrived at the age of *reason* (402 a)? (Poetry is a special case because it can impart "opinion"; of this I shall speak later). Why then is it prescribed as the most important part of their education? Simply because, if it is genuine art, it presents form "in the sensible and by the sensible" as Maritain explains (p. 25). It does not teach, and is obviously not expected by Plato to teach, anyone to see the "form" separately from matter, to apprehend the abstract universal, any more than it is expected to impart skill in arithmetic although all the arts partake in number (522 c). In contemplating beauty the mind "enjoys the radiant presence of an intelligibility" which cannot be detached from the senses, and which "fails to procure an intellectual knowledge susceptible in practice of expression in a concept" (Maritain, p. 162). The same answer will do for Plato too.

Again, Plato is accused of what may be called "exemplarism," as though the painter in imitating a bed (to take his own deliberately ludicrous example) were required to imitate a "type" of bed, embodying perhaps (like the Doryphorus of Polyclitus) an ideal canon of proportions. It is true that for Plato the form or idea of bed is a type or pattern. But it is

invisible and intangible and therefore incapable of "literal" imitation (cf. Maritain, p. 196). It is capable, however, of manifestation (by what Maritain calls "symbols"); and the painter may represent a material bed for the sake of expressing in a sensual medium either the idea of bed or any other idea or form which the matter suggests to his mind.

As for the comparison of poetry with geometry, it is true that, like the other mathematical studies which prepare the soul for dialectic (*Rep.* VI and VII) geometry "lays hold in no small degree" upon the ideal world (533 b). But even mathematics does not give completely genuine knowledge, for it still makes use of visible shapes, it cannot justify its hypotheses, and fails to contemplate the ideas in their purity (510-511). Unlike mathematics, the lower arts fail to transcend the visible world at all; they are immersed in sense and opinion. But none the less, as I have shown, they have reason immanent in them. All this no more implies a "contempt" for art as compared with mathematics, than Maritain's similar statement that the splendour of form, as manifested by art, is apprehended "in the sensible and by the sensible and not separately from it"; and that this apprehension is thus to be sharply distinguished from "the abstraction of scientific truth" (pp. 25-26).

The "exaggerated intellectualism" of Plato has not erred in any of these ways. Its influence is to be seen rather in such requirements as that the ideal artist should be a philosopher, trained by dialectic to see by the eye of reason the Idea of Good from which all other ideas are derived. From that transcendental height it is his duty to descend (*Rep.* 540) to the "cave" for the purpose of ruling and educating his less enlightened fellows by practising such arts as accord with his natural gifts, whether the mathematical arts or the art of lawmaking or of war or painting or poetry or any other. Whatever he does, the idea of Good will serve him as his pattern. For though the arts other than mathematics do not transcend the sphere of

opinion they are akin to mathematics (522 c) inasmuch as they too are preparations in their degree for the study of dialectic, and inasmuch as they exhibit, albeit obscurely, their dependence on rational order and the intelligible world.

So far, something might be said for all this. Conceptual knowledge is not indeed *necessary* to the artist; and yet if he possesses it, it may play a valuable part in his work by way of "dispositive causality" (Maritain, p. 165). Plato's ideal is that poetry, painting, etc., though they do not *convey* knowledge, should nevertheless be produced *in the light of* knowledge of the ideal world. And since the ideal world is separated by him from the concrete world about us, and can be "seen" by reason alone, he creates a similar gulf between reason and the infra-rational faculties of sense and opinion. The opinions of poets such as Homer are in themselves valueless because they do not rise above the world of sense; they are, therefore, deceptive imitations of knowledge, just as the world of sense is an imitation of the intelligible world. The fact that Homer's opinions are often right Plato cannot explain save by assuming a miracle of inspiration—the gods have directly inspired the bard with true beliefs in just the same way as the priestess at Delphi is made to utter words not her own.[2] These exaggerations we may easily heal by closing the gulf on Aristotelian lines. Right opinion is not necessarily due to direct divine inspiration (much less to the kind of mediumistic possession to which Plato liked to ascribe it) but to the all-pervading "natural light of the intellect" by which, spontaneously and unreflectively but yet rationally after a fashion, the artist or anyone else can detect form and meaning as present in reality without discriminating form in all its abstract clarity from the "matrix of

[2] On Plato's view of poetic inspiration see further my articles "Plato and Allegorical Interpretation" (*Classical Quarterly*, Oct. 1929, pp. 147 ff.), "On the History of Allegorism" (*ibid.*, Apr. 1934, p. 112), "Plato and Didacticism" (*Hermathena*, 1933).

the senses" in which it is found. In insisting on the separateness and superior reality of the forms, Plato was guilty of an exaggeration, but an exaggeration which was natural and pardonable in the champion of reason in a world that had gone over to irrationalism. We may sympathize but we need not follow him, save in so far as we can adapt his language to the specifically Christian view that form (meaning, intelligibility), wherever found, really has an existence separate from matter in the sense that it is "derived . . . from the first intelligibility of the divine Ideas" (Maritain, p. 162); it is "a participation in the divine brightness" (St. Thomas quoted by Maritain, p. 31); "a remnant or ray of the Creative Mind" (p. 25). For it may be held that Plato was groping after some such view when he made, for example, the statement (*Rep.* 597, so strangely offensive to many modern commentators) that God creates the forms or ideas (even the idea of bed). This statement appears to mean that the artist cannot extract the idea or form (even the idea of an artificial object) from his own soul; he draws it from material nature and no less from "the intelligible world," of which material nature is in some sense a reflexion.

It is a common practice (see, for example, Bosanquet, *History of Aesthetic,* p. 113) to quote against Plato the doctrine of Plotinus as expressed in the well-known passage (Ennead V viii, 1) to the effect that the arts imitate not only what is seen but the "reasons" which are the basis of "nature"; and that they "create and add many things of themselves since they possess beauty." So far as this passage has any meaning, it is strictly Platonic, as I have shown. And if we are to adopt such a view of art (as Maritain has adopted it), it would be more just, as well as safer and more becoming, to father it upon Plato. Maritain does injustice to Plato in citing Plotinus (pp. 28, 170) in support of the statement that beauty may be "the reflexion upon things of some human or divine thought." If

we speak, even in metaphor, of an "intelligible world," it is immeasurably more correct to borrow our language from Plato than from Plotinus. For we should not allow the modernist rage for Plotinus to blind us to the fact that in Plotinus' intelligible world there are ideas (forms, essences, universals) of individuals; and this is neither Platonism nor good sense. Plotinus' intelligible world is merely the inner face of concrete things, and is "known" not so much by abstract thought (which as an anti-intellectualist he fiercely disliked) as by "une sort d'approfondissement de la sensation" (Bréhier, *La philosophie de Plotin,* pp. xvi, 105). In quoting Plotinus, then, we make it look as if we were willing to concede to the Romantics that art is enough, that not the discursive reason but some kind of "artistic" intoxication (which must needs become mere emotionalism and sentimentalism when the claims of reason are denied) gives genuine contact with reality. A scholastic should find it easier to use, and, incidentally, correct, the clear-cut, if exaggerated, rationalism of Plato.

We can believe then that Plato was fundamentally right in his view of art without expelling Homer from our Republic. The expulsion of Homer is his chief offence in modern eyes. Yet it is perhaps a small matter if compared with his proposal to begin the work by banishing everyone above ten years of age (*Rep.* 540-541). The fact is that Plato was possessed with a desire to begin with a clean sheet. Homer and Hesiod were part and parcel of the society in which he lived, and which he wished to replace with something better. It was a society with an exaggerated respect for those early poets not only as poets but as authorities in religion, morals and most other subjects. This admiration was, according to Plato, a source of scandal to the young and an obstacle to reform. It seemed to him that it was impossible to love and admire those poets without running the risk of being infected (as contemporary society was infected) by false opinions on important matters; for though their

opinions are often right, they are still more frequently wrong. Hence all poets of the Homeric stamp, together with all the numerous believers in the omniscience of the poets (against whom much of *Rep.* X is aimed) must be excluded from the ideal state. Not that poetry as such is excluded. Rather it is Plato's belief that the philosopher-poet who has glimpsed the Absolute Beauty will be able to produce "things really beautiful" and not mere literal imitations of particular beautiful objects (*Symp.* 212 a).

Plato then desired the ideal poet or artist to be a philosopher and the philosopher to be one who could deduce all things from the idea of Good or Beauty. Such at least is the conception of philosopher to which Plato's partial descriptions would seem to lead. I would, however, suggest that, since Plato held philosophy to include virtue and regarded it not as a mere abstract and impersonal study but as a way of life to be followed with burning enthusiasm for the world of ideas, this apparent deductivism or intellectualism together with the quasi-mystical language in which it is frequently expressed, becomes intelligible only as an anticipation of the Christian's desire to see all things in God. Plato, it would seem, hankered after something resembling the Beatific Vision and the perfection of the saints; and these he represented to himself sometimes in mythical, sometimes in intellectual, terms. That his ambition was unattainable on the scale depicted he was willing to admit. In particular he consents to abate his demand for complete intellectual enlightenment on the part of poet and artist. It will suffice if they will submit to the instruction of the philosophers and refrain from rebellion against the rule of law and reason (*Laws* 719, 816-7, etc.). Right opinion will be tolerated as a substitute for that perfect knowledge which is in the nature of the case unattainable. Of course this merely puts the difficulty one stage further back; for the philosophic ruler is still expected to have attained the idea of Good or its equivalent. Since,

however, Plato admits that the world consists of indeterminacy (the matter of Aristotle) as well as a determining element (form), it is probable that, if pressed, he would have regarded "knowledge," in the full Platonic sense, as not strictly attainable even by the philosopher. The world is not wholly deducible, for the indeterminate element eludes thought; and even if it were, why should it be regarded as completely deducible by or even completely intelligible *to us*? Plato's "knowledge" is rather an ideal limit to which the philosopher is required to tend (cf. *Rep.* 592 b). Further, it is significant that the crowning intuition of the idea of Good or Beauty (in *Rep.* and *Symp.*) is not attained by mere dialectic processes. Those processes are rather a preparation only; and it is more true to say that the Supreme Idea gives itself to the intelligence than to say that it is won by human effort alone. Accordingly I have no hesitation in agreeing with J. Adam among other distinguished students of Plato, that the idea of Good or the idea of Beauty is to be identified with what we mean by God. It is God Who creates the ideas (*Rep.* 597), and it is the idea of Good which gives intelligibility and real existence to the objects of knowledge (the lower forms or intelligibles) and yet itself transcends such real existence in dignity and power (*Rep.* 509). It follows that by "God" and the "idea of Good" Plato meant the same thing.[3]

It is clear that Plato's God is not a colourless abstraction, and that his "mysticism" is not of the merely metaphysical variety. His God is Absolute Beauty, Absolute Good, Absolute Reality, the Source of all Truth and all knowledge and intelligi-

[3] I am sorry if the brevity of this argument should shock any philologist who is more impressed than I by the fact that Plato never makes the identification in so many words. Plato's supreme God is 'Nous' (Mind, Reason; for the argument see Hackforth in *Classical Quarterly*, Jany. 1936); He is never *called* a Form; nor is He ever unambiguously called a Soul (the lesser gods are souls, e. g. the soul of the world). But since He is alive, and is Mind, He is clearly a Soul, or indeed the Soul of souls; and also a Form, or indeed the Form of forms.

bility. In the light of this doctrine, the metaphysical treatment of beauty in Plato—at first sight disappointing and doctrinaire —becomes fertile and illuminating. "Beautiful things are beautiful by reason of Beauty" (*Phaedo* 100 d), whatever the nature of the relationship between the particular and the absolute. When "lovers of sights and arts" confound the particular and the absolute, the likeness (concrete beautiful objects) with the Thing reflected (Absolute Beauty), the symbol with That Which is symbolized (*Rep.* 476), then, according to Plato (and to Christianity) they are guilty of idolatry; and we can begin to understand the reason for Plato's hostility towards them as expressed both in *Rep.* X and elsewhere. For Plato's theism is unmistakable; and his constant complaint against earlier poets and philosophers is that they have confused "mind" and "soul" with physical elements; they have failed to isolate "soul" in its purity so as to understand its true nature, and in particular its "priority" to material things (cf. *Laws* 891 c). Hence since the idea of Beauty or Good is not a mere abstraction, not even an ordinary Platonic idea or form, but transcends all such entities, it is not surprising that Plato has so little to say about it, apart from his imaginative descriptions in poetic and mythical language. Of the idea of the Beautiful we learn little save that it is connected through the idea of Measure with the ideas of the Good and the True. Hence the accusation, based on a profound misunderstanding, that Plato confounded the categories of goodness (moral and ontological), beauty and truth. Plato is quite aware that truth, beauty and moral goodness "command distinct spheres of human activity," that they are, so far as this world is concerned, formally distinct aspects of being. But it is not confounding the categories to hold that in God "all these perfections become identified. In Him Truth is Beauty, Goodness, Unity, and they are He" (Maritain, p. 174). On a sympathetic interpretation this is the position to which Plato approaches, though he never

quite succeeded in expressing it. It is obvious that the idea of Beauty in the *Symposium* and the idea of Good in the *Republic* are identical. When, therefore, Maritain adds Beauty to the list of transcendentals, regarding it (because it is a divine attribute) as a property of being, surpassing all limits of category (like the One, the True and the Good), he can claim not only to be faithful to the thought of St. Thomas (" ex divina pulchritudine esse omnium derivatur ") but to the standpoint of Plato. And his position derives strength from the consideration (which at the same time it confirms) that there is more of Platonism in St. Thomas than has sometimes been thought.

In the light of this interpretation it is possible to see what Plato means when he holds that by contemplating *form* we make ourselves " like unto *God* so far as is possible for a man." This contemplation, which culminates for him in dialectic, or rather in a mystic experience superimposed on dialectic, begins, as I have shown, with learning in childhood to love and admire beautiful things, with which the arts should be permitted and encouraged to surround us. (Those who think that art in Plato has nothing to do with beauty have simply failed to read *Rep.* 401-2). But it is impossible to love concrete beauty (which is the manifestation of intelligence—see e. g., *Crat.* 416) without loving truth and virtue, as soon as one becomes capable of reason. So Plato holds; and that he should dwell on the moral effect of good art upon his citizens is natural enough in a statemaker. It is on this ground that he has been censured for making aesthetics synonymous with ethics. But it is important to observe, firstly, that on Plato's own principles, since the arts do not purvey knowledge, they do not directly impart virtue; secondly, that the moral effect of works of art consists simply in infecting young and old with " grace and rhythm and harmony "; and thirdly that Plato never interferes with the *laws of beauty* in the interests of morality, but leaves art free to pursue its own end, while insisting that if art is used (as it

inevitably *is* used) to promote non-artistic ends, then not art but prudence or philosophy shall judge whether such a use is to be permitted. The ethical influence of art lies in encouraging the formation of a well-proportioned nature; a man of such a nature will (he says) be easily led to apprehend the "forms", since truth is more akin to measure than to lack of measure (*Rep.* 486 d). My purpose is not to defend the apparent identification of virtue with knowledge in Plato, but to set my readers on their guard against such statements as that Plato reduced the value of beauty "to the moral lesson imparted by the artist" (Carritt, *The Theory of Beauty*, p. 64). The influence of beautiful works upon the young is compared by Plato to a wind imperceptibly bearing health from goodly regions (*Rep.* 401 cd). I cannot see that it is legitimate to infer from such a phrase that art is expected by him to inculcate explicitly a "moral lesson." The charge that Plato's aesthetic is "moralistic" might just as readily, and just as foolishly, be made to include the view of Maritain and Bremond (*Prayer and Poetry*, English trans., p. 199) who agree that "Beauty tends of itself to unite us to God."

Perhaps, however, the misunderstanding arises from the special treatment of poetry in *Rep.* II and III, in which case it is on a par with the really outrageous statement of Havelock Ellis (*The Dance of Life*, p. 317), that Plato "was all for goody-goody literature."[4] The facts are as follows: Plato lays down certain principles (such as that God is good, unchanging, truthful). He requires that *all* poets in his ideal state should *refrain from denying* these principles. Further, since poetry will be used in the education of the young, he requires that *some* poets, those, namely, who undertake to write what the young will read, shall illustrate such truths as these in the

[4] I take this reference from K. Gilbert's excellent essay "The Relation of the Moral to the Aesthetic Standard in Plato" (*The Philosophical Review*, May 1934).

fictions which they create. (Other arts as well as poetry are to some extent involved; for example, the maidens of the ideal state will not be required, as they were in contemporary Athens, to embroider the robe of Athena with false tales—apparently censured by the historic Socrates [5]—of wars among the gods.) The scholastic will not misunderstand these requirements. To ask the poets to refrain from contradicting the truth is an eminently reasonable procedure. Even if it be a condition imposed by a censorship upon unwilling minds, it remains an *extrinsic* condition in no wise interfering with the practice of the art. Plato's ideal is, of course, not that such truths should be imposed on the artist from without; they should be part of his very being. But even if the individual fails to achieve an adequate measure of that "autonomy" which consists in having his personality permeated by law and reason, nevertheless he cannot be allowed to say what he likes; such permission would not constitute freedom for him; obedience to law is the only method by which he can achieve emancipation from fatal errors. Hence the need for external law and censorship, precisely that the imperfectly enlightened may be free so far as possible from the bondage of ignorance and superstition. Again, the demand that the myths composed for the young should illustrate true "morals" follows inevitably from the consideration that the young, before they reach the age of reason, can contract "opinions"; it seems foolish to ask them to begin their rational life handicapped by false notions which will have to be unlearned later, when it is just as easy to supply them with a correct set of beliefs from the start. There is no hint that Plato would be partial to mawkish ("goody-goody") sentimentality; such a view implies, I fear, that the interpreter has no conception of what Plato meant by the life of virtue, which is a life of heroism and

[5] For the relevance of this to the trial and execution of Socrates see my article "Plato, Socrates and the Myths" (*Classical Quarterly*, Oct. 1936) and other articles there cited.

enthusiasm. The true "morals" which the poet illustrates are not to be mere external and impersonal truths for which he is to show a hypocritical affection; they are to be, if possible, "moulds," i. e., modifications, habits, of his cognitive faculty; failing that, they will be, at the worst, merely part of the material conditions of his work. Plato is aware too that in laying down these requirements he is in no sense giving a recipe for the composition of poetry. See *Rep.* 378 e, 379 a "you and I are not poets on the present occasion but founders of a city" etc., and 401 c where good natural talent is required in the artist. But is he not depriving poetry of its pleasure in admitting to his state only the "more austere and less pleasing poet" of *Rep.* 398 a? The answer is that the ideal poets will be less pleasing only in the sense in which "pleasure" means *exclusively* sensual and emotional pleasure (which is "sham" pleasure, *Rep.* 583 b). Beauty and genuine pleasure are bound up with law and order and truth, as I have already shown; and genuine pleasure will even serve as a criterion of poetic merit (*Laws*, 658-9). With the positive and negative didactic requirements of Plato Maritain is in fundamental agreement. See e. g. p. 75 with its quotation from St. Thomas who would curb the evil use of an art *secundum documenta Platonis*; control "from without" must necessarily be imposed upon art "in the name of a higher end"—the good of the subject (as opposed to the good of the object, which is the concern of art alone). See also p. 119 on the relation of art and the moral law.

Finally it may be asked whether there is any warrant in Plato for the distinction between fine and useful arts. All arts are imitative in Plato which (a) express form (as the carpenter copies or imitates the form of bed in *Rep.* X), (b) express character (as, above all others, music and drama) (c) represent natural appearances (as painting, sculpture). But these are not meant to be exclusive divisions. Class (a) is wholly contained within class (b); and both (b) and (c) are required to

express form in just the same way as the "useful" art of the carpenter; they are, in fact, genuine arts only when (b) expresses "good" character (as it is required to do with certain exceptions), in which case it is imitating the rationality and intelligibility implicit in such a character and can be carried out only by one who knows in some sense what good character means; and when (c) manifests not only the appearances of natural objects but also the intelligibles to which appearances point. The term "imitative" which Plato uses in all these ways will not correspond to the term "fine" (as has been suggested—see, e. g. Bosanquet, *op. cit.*, p. 54). For the "fine" arts aim at beauty; but according to Plato beauty enters into all the arts: "painting and all such craftsmanship, weaving, embroidery, architecture, all manufacture of utensils and the growth of living bodies and all plants; in all these things grace, rhythm and harmony (i. e., beauty) . . . are akin to, and *imitations* of, the good and virtuous character." Thus all arts, whether they are addressed to the "opinions and desires of men" (like poetry, and rhetoric) or are concerned with production, or with the tendance of things that grow (like medicine and agriculture)—this being the classification suggested in *Rep.* 533 b — are imitative; and this accords with *Rep.* X. The artist is "imitative" whether he literally imitates material nature (in which case his art is a fake) or both imitates nature and, like nature itself, imitates what lies beyond nature. I am unable to find in Plato anything resembling the distinction between fine and useful arts. Nor do I see that Maritain succeeds in validating the distinction, if indeed that is what he wishes to do. On p. 33 we read that the fine arts "differ essentially from all the rest" because they are "ordered to beauty"; but on p. 155 it is stated that the division of the arts into fine and useful "is not what logicians term an 'essential' division" and that "the same art can quite well pursue usefulness and beauty at the same time," e. g. "architecture."

But if this is true of architecture, why not of all the arts listed by Plato in *Rep.* 401? Besides, as we have seen, even Maritain finds a utility in the so-called fine arts.

It may be well to add some brief remarks on Aristotle's views on beauty and their relations to those which we find in Plato. "Beauty consists in magnitude and order," he says in the *Poetics*, 1450 b 36. An artistic work should possess "the organic unity of a living creature" (1459 a 20). Symmetry, magnitude, order are his requirements elsewhere. At first sight this doctrine is that of Plato with the transcendence of beauty omitted, and its intelligibility left unemphasized. Hence Bosanquet (*op. cit.*, p. 76) regards the equation of beauty with symmetry as "dangerously formal and empty." Even so, Aristotle's insistence on the objectivity of beauty would be worth noting; unity in variety is the *fundamentum in re*; and it is not true that "beauty does not exist except when experienced" any more than it is true that "sound and colour do not exist except when perceived" (Carritt, *op. cit.*, p. 21); for all these qualities, according to sound Aristotelian tradition, are rooted in the structure of substances, and our perception of them is valid evidence as to the nature of things. But if we look more closely at the *Poetics* we see in the first place that the pleasure which we derive from art is necessarily intellectual, according to the doctrine of imitation there explained (1448 b). It is a pleasure of recognition, of learning, a pleasure such as may be gained from a portrait in black and white but not from "the finest colours laid on without order" (1450 b 1). Further, the keynote of the doctrine of the *Poetics* is order, and, further, order which is not merely mechanical but vital and necessary; as in an organism, every element must be so structurally interconnected with every other element in the literary whole, that any transposition or removal will throw the work into disorder (1451 a 31). Whence comes this quasi-organic order? It is dictated by a "principle" by, "as it were, a soul"; and this

principle is (in epic and tragic poetry at least) the plot (1450 a 38). What is the plot? Not just a puzzle for solution (cf. Bosanquet, *op. cit.*, p. 71). It is a philosophical simplification of history. History is too complicated for us to see its unity; its stage is broader than we know, its time unlimited, and its drama not yet played out. In this congeries of apparently disconnected events the poet detects a form, a meaning, which strings together certain particular occurrences in the order of necessity or probability. Then like the painter he selects his materials carefully, excising all irrelevant details, for the purpose of exhibiting this form, idea, meaning, "soul," to us, not with conceptual clarity but in a plot which is a recognizable imitation of human life and nature. It is in this way that poetry is "more philosophic than history" (1451 b 5); it depicts events which are "universal," in the sense that they form part of an intelligible scheme, which is a rendering of the way in which things happen in accordance with necessary or probable causes. The point which I wish to emphasize is that with Aristotle as with Plato *symmetry is not an end in itself*; it is the fruit of *form*, which it is the function of the artist to discriminate amid a mass of concrete particulars, and then to present to us in a sensible medium, not as an abstraction but as a principle immanent in the world of man and his environment. Aristotle, then, is in fundamental agreement with Plato. The only difference is that since he is not interested in the question of the ultimate origin of form and intelligibility, he has nothing to say of beautiful works as "symbolic" of "the intelligible world." For that aspect of beauty we must go back to Plato; and we can do so with safety only when we realize that "intelligible world" is little more than a metaphorical term for the reason which, strictly inhering in concrete reality, is nevertheless a reflexion of the Divine Intelligence (cf. Maritain, p. 31).

Aristotle's insistence on the vivifying principle which is the

"life and soul" of the work of art makes it clear that his criterion of art would not be any barren and mechanical symmetry. The vital, organic unity which he desires the artist to achieve comes from "form," and is possible only when the artist grasps form or idea with his own living personality. In spite of misunderstandings, it was not Aristotle's intention to substitute dead rules for the living grammar or logic of art which is spontaneously imposed by a vital apprehension of form. The classicism which pretended to judge poetry by such rules was out of touch with Aristotelianism. There is no foot-rule by which we can measure the vigour and profundity of the artist's appropriation and expression of form. The Romantics were right in insisting on the importance of inspiration; or rather they would have been right if they had meant by inspiration the vital apprehension of form. They were right too (for reasons suggested above) in emphasizing the part played by the artist's personality; they would have been still more right if they had made it clear to the artist that it is his business not merely to express his personality but to blend it with his work in the very act of seeking the perfection of his work. For, as Maritain says (pp. 97-8) art "expresses the personality of the artist to the outside world in so far as the artist forgets his personality in his object."

Besides an intellectual pleasure, epic and tragic poetry provide, according to Aristotle, an emotional satisfaction by playing on the emotions of pity and fear. This satisfaction he calls "katharsis," and since his explanation of this word has not come down to us, it has become fashionable for everyone who has a theory to account for the effect of tragedy upon the spectator (the reader of epic and of tragedy should also be included) to say that *this* (whatever it be) is what Aristotle's "katharsis" means. I should like to enter a mild protest against this fashion. We have some evidence which bears on Aristotle's meaning; my most effective plan will be to state briefly the

direction in which it points. (It may be found in J. Croissant's *Aristote et les Mystères*, criticized and partly summarized in my article *Tragedy and the Black Bile* in the forthcoming number of *Hermathena*). The kathartic effect (of music) is sharply opposed by Aristotle to an effect which is ethical or educative (*Pol.* 1341 a); hence his katharsis has nothing to do with the ethical katharsis described in Plato's *Phaedo*. For Aristotle it is primarily a medical term; it means "purgation," and it is applicable to any treatment which (whether medical or musical or what not) counteracts the black bile and the emotions arising from that humour (which include pity, fear and religious mania). The mystic rites "purge" the agitation of the "enthusiast" by means of a more powerful agitation. Plato had noticed in *Laws* 790-1 that the Bacchic frenzy was relieved by artificially arousing a Bacchic excitement; agitation is relieved by agitation (he explains) in much the same way as a crying baby is soothed by the rocking of the cradle. Aristotle offers a more profound explanation by relating the curative phenomenon to the humoral psycho-physiology: the artificial excitement of pity and fear (as by tragedy) pleasantly counteracts the natural motions (which, if strong enough, translate themselves into emotions in the infra-rational soul) of the black bile. So far as the evidence goes, katharsis does not involve the will or the reason; it is a harmless emotional pleasure. It does not mean purification of the passions by harmonizing them with intelligence (as Maritain—pp. 51, 65—, among others, thinks). So far as Aristotle is concerned, tragedy has no such *directly* moral effect; though there is nothing to prevent anyone using tragedy and its effect for some moral end (e. g., to make control of the passions easier). In sum, my reading of the situation is this: Aristotle thought that by giving the name "katharsis" to the emotional satisfaction which we derive from tragedy he was shedding light upon the nature of that satisfaction. But in fact he shed no light. The theory of the four humours is

long since out-moded; and Aristotle's theory of katharsis may be dropped with as little scruple as we discard his astronomy.

But to return to my main point. My contention is that in his manner of relating beauty to "the intelligible world" Maritain is in accord with Plato (as well as with Aristotle and St. Thomas). It must be repeated that for Plato as for Maritain intelligibility does not exclude, but rather involves, the quality of mystery. If I may attempt to summarize a portion of Maritain's important fifth chapter, things are beautiful because delightsome, delightsome because intelligible, intelligible because mysterious. Those who (influenced consciously or unconsciously by Descartes) regard intelligibility as consisting merely in a subjective clarity in our own ideas (as if we could hope to exhaust truth in a formula) very naturally object to our attempting in any way to relate art to truth and being. They will be as likely to think that Plato made genuine art impossible by insisting on its intelligible character (in *Rep.* III) as others are to imagine that he made it impossible by excluding that intelligible or ideal character from the art which is condemned in *Rep.* X. For since art cannot deal in clear ideas, they cannot see how it can have anything to do with ideas at all; and so they confine art to the sphere of sense and emotion to which, nevertheless, they are apt to give high-sounding names, such as "intuition" or "Transcendental Feeling." In other respects too it is unlikely that a sympathetic and consistent account of the aesthetic of Plato and Aristotle will be found in those modern writers who since the middle of the 18th century have sought to revive the study of aesthetic. Non-scholastic, anti-Platonic, anti-Aristotelian, they grind the ancients in their own modern mills; and in the process those qualities which would naturally commend the aesthetic of Plato and Aristotle to scholastic thinkers, become unrecognizable. Aristotle's objectivity, for example, rouses Croce's scorn. Or again, the careful delimitation of the autonomy of the arts gives rise to accusations

of "moralism" etc., on the part of those numerous writers who adopt the pseudo-humanistic attitude of regarding all the various forms of human activity as ends in themselves, to be kept strictly apart in water-tight compartments and never related to one another or to any final end. Such writers are almost bound to misunderstand Plato; I suggest that instead of taking over these misunderstandings without examination, scholastic writers on aesthetic should study Plato himself before pronouncing on his contribution to the subject.

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MATTER IN THE "DE ENTE" *

THE purpose of this examination of the use of the term "matter" in the *De Ente et Essentia* of St. Thomas is to attempt to ascertain what differences, if any, that term is found to have in various contexts; and, in the light of those differences, to determine insofar as possible the logical and metaphysical rôles of matter in that work.

In so tightly packed a document as the *De Ente* it is no easy chore to keep track of all the distinctions made by the author himself. To attempt to introduce even further distinctions would be foolhardy; nor is that necessary. My sole purpose is to understand, if possible, the significance of those distinctions and, as I hope, to point out certain implications following therefrom.

Early in the work, one encounters two statements significant for the argument: first, "matter is neither a principle of cognition, nor is anything determined as regards genus and species according to matter" [1] and, second, "essence embraces both matter and form." [2]

The objection is then raised that, since matter is the principle of individuation, it might seem to follow that essence could be only particular, never universal. To remove this difficulty, the most significant distinction among the meanings of matter is introduced: it is designated matter (*materia signata*) only which is the principle of individuation; and by designated matter is meant that which is considered as under determined dimensions. Illustrating the distinction, St. Thomas points out that, in the definition of man as man, undesignated matter

* Read at the Thirty-second Annual Meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Columbia, S. C., March 26, 1937.

[1] *On Being and Essence*, translated by Clare C. Riedl, Toronto, 1934, p. 20.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

(*materia non signata*) is posited; whereas designated matter would be posited in the definition of Socrates if Socrates had a definition. For in the definition of man, there is posited not this particular bone and this particular flesh, "but bone and flesh considered absolutely" as undesignated.

Already then, much has been learned about designated matter. It is the stuff of which this dog, this man, this bird are made. It is the principle of individuation. Further, it is because designated matter enters into the constitution of the individual that the individual defies definition. Obviously, the implication is that there is an unintelligibility about designated matter, the very matter of the world of things. It can only be denoted. It cannot be quite intelligently talked about. For, though in the individual of whatever species it is always informed, it would appear to cling to certain predispositions which preclude its being taken up into the intelligibility of the form it has received. It is not bone, not flesh; it is this bone, this flesh; and its 'thisness' makes of it a surd.

Then, what of undesignated matter, the matter which in union with form constitutes the essence and the definition of man as man? By essence and even more obviously by definition, is meant that aspect of a thing in virtue of which it is what it is *as intelligible*. As against matter, form is the principle of intelligibility. St. Thomas explicitly accepts this position in the fourth chapter of the *De Ente* in maintaining that the intelligible substances, God and the angels, are unions not of form and matter but rather of form and existence (essence and existence being, of course, identical in God; and form plus potentiality constituting the essence of the angels). Since the essence of a thing is that in virtue of which a thing is what it is as intelligible, and since form only is intelligible, how then is one to account for the inclusion of matter in the essences of composite things? The answer to this question is the major concern of this paper.

From species considered as a starting point, matter appears to operate under two aspects and in a double direction. Designated matter, as we have seen, is that principle of individuation which, entering into union with the form of man, constitutes the nature of the concrete existing first substance, Socrates; while matter (undesignated) is included in the essence of man as man. In the second case, matter's ingression into the total situation is not—as it were—from the bottom up, but from the top down. For it is through the genus that matter is found to be included in the definition of the species, as the following brief quotations indicate: "genus signifies the whole as a certain determination, determining what is material in a thing." [3] ". . . genus is taken from matter . . ." [4]—". . . the name signifying that from which the nature of the genus is taken . . . should signify the material part of the whole itself." [5] Of course, it must be remembered that this is only matter in the second sense, undesignated matter, whatever meaning that term may prove to have. It would obviously be nonsense to talk of designated matter in this context. For designated matter, occurring only in concrete existing individuals, can be no part of genus or species, which are only logical abstractions—*entia rationis*, not *entia naturae*.

As otherwise regarded, the relation of genus to species would appear to differ so widely from that just cited that it is difficult to reconcile the two. For here genus is treated only as a "wider" form, potentially including the more determinate form brought through the difference into the species. ". . . genus signifies some form, not however determinately this or that particular form which difference expresses determinately, for this is no other than that form which is signified indeterminately by genus." [6] ". . . genus is called one because of commonness of its signified form." [7] "And in this way body

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 26.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 29.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

is the genus of animal, because it is impossible to have anything in animal which is not contained implicitly in body; . . . And thus the form of animal is implicitly contained in the form of body, according as body is its genus." [8]

It is at this point in my opinion that the question of the genuine materiality of non-designated matter becomes crucial. For, if, as the preceding quotations seem to indicate, the relation of species to genus is that of a narrower to a wider form, in what sense is it proper to maintain that genus is the matter to which species imparts form? Might it not be contended that the terms "designated matter" and "undesignated matter" have such totally divergent connotations that they scarcely deserve to be known by the common name "matter" at all? For undesignated matter appears, when pressed, to collapse entirely into form. Whether and in what sense this charge is justified I shall now try to determine.

Obviously, the very meaning of "designated matter" indicates its lack of qualification to be used in the context of genus and species. It is the principle of individuation and, by its nature, implies a certain unintelligibility. Hence, it can have no traffic with the logical intentions of genus and species. It can enter only into the nature of first substance; and, in this context, be it noted, "essence" may not properly be used. The individual's essence, as individual, is rather to be called "nature" as the first principle of its being and operations.

But, on the other hand, when one attempts to introduce undesignated matter into the context of first substance, the situation is no better. For "these bones" and "this flesh" are the constituent elements of the concrete existing Socrates; not bone and flesh considered absolutely—undesignated matter.

At the beginning of the second chapter, St. Thomas has explicitly denied that the form only constitutes the essence or definition of a composite substance; and it is on good logical

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

grounds that he does so for, as he adds, ". . . otherwise natural definitions would not differ from mathematical ones." [9] It is, then, in recognition of the need for this very real distinction that matter is included in the definition of natural substances. But in what does that inclusion result? On the level at which the problem has thus far been treated, it results, in my opinion, in the following dilemma: either attempting to take up into the context of rational discourse that which is by its nature unintelligible (i. e. designated matter), or so altering the signification of the term "matter" that one must admit that what he is talking about is not matter at all, but simply another form; or, if not that, nothing at all.

To resolve this difficulty, a further distinction is necessary. Reference was made above to concrete existing first substances, this man, this bird, this dog. For St. Thomas, these are the only existential realities—at least in the realm of composite substances, unions of matter and form. They are *entia naturae*. As against them, there are second substances, so called, essences in the strict sense, genera and species: man, bird, dog. These are logical abstractions only, *entia rationis*. To the extent that they have existence, it is in two limited aspects only: they exist as individualized in particulars, always in union with designated matter and hence as wholly circumscribed; they exist *in the mind* as universals; but considered as neither in the mind nor in things, they exist as neither universal nor particular, and hence not at all.

Since first substances are real natural things, obviously it is knowledge about them which is to constitute for man knowledge in any real sense. But the individual, being, as we have seen, at least partially unintelligible, no knowledge or science of individuals is possible. Hence, as soon as one passes from the mere sensuous apprehension of the concrete individual to that in it which is intelligible—or rather that in virtue of

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

which it is what it is as intelligible—second substances are necessarily the subject-matter of inquiry. Hence, the intellect is constrained to make the second substance, insofar as possible, a perfect analogue of the first, excluding only those unintelligible accretions due to designated matter. Now, first substance, being a union of matter and form, may be called a "this-such." The *this* is, of course, the material element which actually exists; the *such* is the formal element, likewise actually existing, determining the way or ways in which, within certain limits, the *this* must exist. Socrates, an *ens naturae*, is a this—a material substrate—and a *such*, the concatenation of forms constituting him a man. The second substance, the *ens rationis*, then, to be an adequate analogue, must likewise be a *this-such*; and so it proves to be. Man, or humanity, is a *this*, animality, plus a *such*, rationality. The difference, rationality, is conceived as a form, laid upon the logically prior substrate, the genus animality, and together constituting the species humanity. In this way, by analogy to first substance, genus may be said to be the "matter" and species the "form." This is the meaning of the distinction between designated and undesignated matter; and this is the justification for knowing them both by the one name, matter.

An additional difficulty would appear to present itself. Animal is called the material element of man since it is the proximate genus thereof. But let us now regard animal itself as a species. Body is its genus and hence its matter. Other forms are its differentiae. Hence, animal, which as regards the species was the matter, is now itself treated as a species, that is a union of form and matter. What in one context was matter alone proves in another to be both matter and form. Does this tend to blur the correspondence between designated and undesignated matter? I think not; for in the context of second substance there is nothing to hinder a perfect relativity of matter and form until the *summa genera* be reached. For in no appli-

cation of the matter-form analysis is a metaphysical dualism implied. Neither the one nor the other is considered to be an independently existing natural entity, as for instance, material and spiritual substance are for Descartes. Designated matter has received form in the individual; undesignated matter is a pure abstraction. Prime matter is, of course, a terminal point in abstraction; as St. Thomas puts it in the *De Ente*, ". . . prime matter is called one by the remotion of all forms." [10] Only as logical abstractions then can the one principle be found in isolation from the other (except, as noted above in the cases of God, the angels and the human soul).

To return then to the dilemma posed above in reference to the alleged contradiction in the use of the term "matter" as both designated and undesignated, I should maintain the problem has been resolved as far as it is possible ever to do so. For the undesignated matter of second substance has been shown to be the closest possible analogue to the designated matter of first substance. And though the residue of unintelligibility of the matter in first substance cannot be overcome, it can at least be recognized; and, on these premises, that is the simple recognition that a science of particulars is possible only for God. But even first matter is not set over against form—or against mind—as an equipollent and independently existing stuff. It is only logic's recognition of what cannot be intelligibly grasped; though unintelligible, it too is an abstraction; and with the opposed abstraction of form, it points the way to a metaphysics.

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

A BRIEF SURVEY OF CONFUCIUS' POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

This paper is primarily based on original Chinese sources, especially the Confucian Classics. Except in the first part, the author uses some English sources such as Brind Brown, *The Story of Confucius, His Life and Sayings* (Philadelphia, 1927); Herbert A. Giles, *A Chinese Bibliographic Dictionary* (London and Shanghai, 1898); and Edward Parker, *The Life, Labours and Doctrines of Confucius,* reprinted from the Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, April, 1897. In the second part the author in most cases tries to digest what are written in the Confucian classics; some of them he remembers ever since he was a boy, some of them are recently re-studied and more carefully examined. However, direct quotations from Confucius are given in footnotes for convenient reference.

1. *A Brief Biography of Confucius*

CONFUCIUS has been looked upon as one of the greatest sages and a fountain of wisdom and learning of the Orient and in fact of the whole civilized world. His ethical, educational and philosophical teachings are particularly known to the learned world. He is sometimes, rightly or wrongly, regarded as a master of his own religion, which is of course a very debatable question. His political philosophy, though, exercised a great influence on the form of the Chinese Government and its underlying principles; this, however, has been overshadowed by the predominance of his philosophy, ethics, or moral teachings and educational instructions.

Since Confucius (551-479 B. C.) as a scholar, philosopher, educator, and political thinker, occupies a unique place in the learned world, whether or not one likes his theories or teachings beyond the boundaries of China is of no particular significance. It is a fact that every Chinese at least has to learn something about Confucius from his boyhood. No Chinese would be considered intelligent or learned without knowing this great sage's works. To the student of political science, it is of

high importance to make a study of the political philosophy of this great sage of all time and of all the nations.

In order to facilitate the study of his political philosophy, it is necessary to give a brief account of his life.

Confucius is a Latinized name of "K'ung Fu Tzû," meaning "Master K'ung" the name by which he was called by his disciples. There are several legends attached to the circumstances of his birth.[1] Apart from these fantasies, it seems that he was of good ancestry; for he was descended from a half-brother of the Shang Emperor, who had ruled the feudal state of Sung with its capital at Kuei Teh-Fu in Honan Province. About two and a half centuries prior to the time of this great sage, the reigning Duke abdicated in favor of his younger brother; this compelled the 5th generation to follow the custom of founding a new clan, and taking a new name. The new name chosen was that of K'ung. The great-grandfather of this sage moved northward from Sung into Lu, in what is now called Shangtung Province, to escape from an hereditary feud. Confucius' father was a military official of Lu, brave in nature and commanding in person. This military officer had had nine daughters by his wife and a crippled son by his second wife, and, greatly desiring another son, when over seventy years old he married a young girl. She bore him Confucius in 551 B. C. at Sau Shui in Shangtung Province. This newly-born boy's name was "Mou" and at the age of three his father passed away. His mother moved to Ch'u-fou of the same province. K'ung-mou was sober-minded in his boyhood and found his chief amusement in grave imitation of ceremonies, with paraphernalia of the sacrifices as his favorite toys. He was married at the age of 18 and a son was born to him next year and a daughter was born to him later. His grandson, K'ung-chi,

[1] *The Life of Confucius* reproduced from a book entitled *Shêng Chi T'u* (Shanghai, 1934).

better known as Tzû Ssu, was a noted teacher and expounder of his grandfather's doctrines.

Confucius had about seven-two disciples and 3,000 followers. They all addressed him as "Master"; most of Confucius' thought was transcribed by his disciples and followers. *The Analects of Confucius*, a record of the conversations between the Master and his disciples as well as other noted persons, is an outstanding example.

In regard to Confucius' interest in the realm of politics, it is very interesting to know that he was an ardent student of history, and visited the Imperial City of Lo-yang (in Honan Province) to study the Imperial archives, with the declared intention of deducing sound ideas on the principles and practice of good government. During this visit he interviewed Lao-Tzû, who was the director of the archives. Lao Tzû made some severe criticism of him and on the study of human knowledge for Lao-Tzû was a much older man than Confucius and as a senior, according to the Chinese custom, he had the right to speak as an elder-scholar.

In spite of his keen interest in the study of politics, Confucius did not overlook music. To him, music was not only a means of enjoyment but also a means of training and developing the character or personality of man. He thought that it was necessary for every cultured man to know something about music. Once upon a time when he heard a good musical program in the Feudal State of Chi, he enjoyed it so much that he forgot the taste of meat for three months. He then said to his disciples that not until that time did he realize the influence of music on him was so great.

Confucius' practice of government began from the time when he returned from Lo-yang to the Feudal State of Lu in Shangtung Province. He followed the Duke of Lu who was later in exile on account of the change of internal politics. Confucius accompanied the exiled Duke. But the next Duke urged Con-

fucius to enlist under him; Confucius complied with his wishes. This perhaps was because the Duke on the one hand knew that Confucius was a good administrator of Government and on the other hand Confucius did not feel happy at having been out of government employ for three months. After his acceptance of a governmental position offered to him by the new Duke, Confucius was gradually promoted to the position of "Minister of Justice." During the time of his Ministership of Justice, wonderful accounts were made of the speedy improvement in the people's condition and morals. For example, it has been recorded in the History of China that after Confucius had been Minister of Justice for three months, the whole country was in peace and order. When people dropped their gold in the streets, other persons would pick it up for the losers and sometimes the lost gold was just left in the streets. Under these circumstances, the ruler of the neighboring state of Ch'i was greatly alarmed and even somewhat jealous of this improvement. He thereupon sent the Duke of Lu a number of very beautiful girls and fine horses in order to divert his interest in the reform of Government. This political trick was successful and the Sage then was not trusted by the Duke of Lu and finally was compelled to leave the country in disgrace.

When he left the State of Lu, he was 57 years of age. Greatly disappointed in practical politics, Confucius then devoted most of his time to teaching his disciples and followers. He continued his teachings for almost the remainder of his life. He spent almost 12 years in visiting many of the feudal Courts to preach his moral, philosophical and political doctrines but he met practically no success. On one occasion the sage narrowly escaped with his life. After 12 years of unsuccessful wandering from state to state, Confucius returned to the State of Lu. Subsequently, he concentrated his mind on the editing of the classics of his previous years. The *Five Canons* of today are substantially the same as he left them (the *Five Canons* are

sometimes called the *Five Classics,* namely, the *Book of Changes,* the *Book of Odes,* the *Book of History,* the *Canon of Rites,* the *Springs and Autumns* or *Annals of Confucius*). In particular, the *Springs and Autumns* or *Annals of Confucius* is a record of the State of Lu. It shows that he condemned rebellious movements and supports the authorities of the Central Government. Thus, some scholars interpret this to mean that Confucius was always in favor of a strong central government. At the time of Confucius, neither the rulers of different feudal States nor the ordinary people appreciated the theories of the sage. He died in 479 B. C. filled with a sense of failure and disappointment in his preaching and teaching works. His death was mourned only by his disciples at his tomb for three years. Though the Duke of Lu built a temple to the dead sage and sacrifices were held for him for a certain period of time, yet this practice was discontinued with the advent of the First Emperor of the Dynasty of Chin, 221 B. C. Not until 300 years after his death, did the Imperial Government give recognition to his memory. If Confucius had not been wise enough to put some of his books, finished and unfinished, in the walls of a house, the First Emperor of the Chin Dynasty would have ordered all his books burned. Having in this manner escaped burning, his historical works were discovered in the walls of ruined houses in the Dynasty of Han (201 to 220 A. D.). It is due to this fact, that it is possible for us to study Confucius' political thought today.

2. *Confucius' Political Philosophy*

Without touching upon the doubtful question of Confucianism as a religion, let us directly and briefly proceed to the discussion of Confucius' political philosophy.

Neither a system of philosophy nor a religion was what Confucius had at heart; he was interested in one philosophical

subject only, Ethics, and chiefly with Ethics as applied to the art of Government. Confucius spent the best part of his life at the various Courts of different Feudal States trying to influence the rulers to apply his doctrines. He devoted himself to teaching his disciples and followers the art of Government only after he failed in dealing with those courts. The keen interest of Confucius in government might be explained by the fact that he was willing to render a service to the Empire which was at that time in confusion. The central government was weak and the feudal lords in continual strife.

To the mind of this great sage, ethics and education were the best fundamental cures for the political ills of his own time. Within the scope of ethics Confucius stressed the following five elements, namely, *Jen* meaning kindness, benevolence, sympathy, fellow-feeling; *Yi,* justice or righteousness; *Li,* meaning propriety; *Chih,* meaning intelligence, power of sound judgment and discrimination; and *Hsin,* meaning fidelity to one's words, faithfulness. These five cardinal virtues, to the mind of this sage comprise the whole duty of man. Man is the most important element of family society and state; and the Universe. Confucius thought that if a man were educated in these virtuous ways, when he held a public office he would not be led into ways of impropriety. In particular, Confucius emphasized the virtue of fidelity or filial piety which has become one of the greatest virtues of the Chinese. Confucius' doctrine of morality and ethics may be perhaps compared to the Ethics of Plato and the Stoics.

Confucius wished to enforce his virtues by means of education or teaching. He claimed that if a man knew all these virtues he would not do something he knew to be evil. His conception of a government of "good rulers" is therefore again based on his moral principles. He sought for wise, virtuous and just rulers, and considered that "Benevolent or Good Gov-

ernment" can be easily facilitated through the means of education.[2] It is no wonder that Confucius was of the opinion that:

> Reason is to illustrate virtue. Virtue is to respect reason. Without virtue, reason will not be respected. Without reason, virtue will not be illustrated. Education is the means of attaining virtue and of illustrating reason.[3]

Since Confucius placed government on a purely ethical and educational basis, it was reasonable for him to advocate the so-called "Doctrine of Rectification," which means the making of distinction between right and wrong, the true and the untrue, the beautiful and the ugly, the governing and the governed, etc. It is because the government is governed by the attitude of mind of the mass of people. If their minds tend in the right direction, the state will be sound and *vice versa.* In this connection, it is germane at this point to quote a statement from this sage, as follows:

> One day a prince asked the Master about government. The Master replied: 'There is a government, when the prince is prince and the minister is minister, when the father is father and the son is son.'
>
> 'Good!' said the prince. 'If, indeed, the prince be not the prince, the minister be not the minister, the father be not the father, and the son be not the son, although I have my revenue, can I enjoy it?'[4]

This means that in the affairs of a state, it is necessary for the sovereign, the subjects, the head of the family and the children all to do their respective rights and duties. Otherwise, there will be usurpation and chaos.

[2] Confucius emphasized education so much that it is no wonder even almost twenty centuries after the death of the sage that there is a Korean scholar who advocates "Confucian educational system will meet the needs of Korea today." See Chungil Y'han Roe, *The True Function of Education in Social Adjustment; A Comparative Estimate and Criticism of the Educational Teachings of Confucius and the Philosophy of John Dewey with a View to Evolving a Project for a System of National Education which will meet the Needs of Korea* (Lincoln, Neb., 1927).

[3] Tai Tai Li, meaning the Elder, *Tai's Record of Rites,* chapter on "Words of the Master."

[4] *Confucian Analects,* bk. XII, ch. xi.

It is erroneous to assume as certain Westerners do, that the Chinese place so much emphasis on family that their sense and conception of "state" is very vague and the Confucius' idea of state is equally ambiguous. Although Confucius gave no formal definition of the State, yet throughout his works and the classics he edited, the distinction between State and Government is maintained. For instance, the characters *Kuo* or *Pang* are used to designate the State; the character *Chêng* to mean government or politics; and the character *Wei* to designate Government offices.[5]

In regard to what the modern writers on political science call the essentials of the State, Confucius pointed out: *Min,* or the people, *Chêng,* or the Government, and *Ti,* or the territory; that a State is a group of people living in a certain territory with a government.[6]

The State also has its symbols, namely, the *She-Chi,* or the Altars to the Spirit of Territory and Grain, the *Tsung-Maio,* or the Ancestral Temple, and the *Ch'ao-ting,* or the Court. These, like the national flag of a modern State, represent the State and Government, and should be respected. Sovereigns might die or the people might sacrifice their lives and property in order to defend these national symbols.

As to the justifications for the existence of the State, this sage was of the opinion that the State came into existence as a result of the necessity for driving out wild animals, controlling floods, famines, etc., so that the people might pursue peaceably their ordinary way of living. The promotion of welfare of the people, to the mind of Confucius, contributed another reason for the existence of the State and political authority. Furthermore, in the *Book of Change,* it was pointed out that the State

[5] See *Confucian Analects,* bk. I, ch. v; bk. II, chs. i, xxi; bk. —, chs. xiii, xiv, etc.

[6] *Ibid.,* bk. I, ch. v; bk. II, chs. i, iii, xxi; bk. III, ch. xxi; bk. VIII, bk. XIV, and bk. XVI, etc.

is an important institution in adjusting human and natural phenomena for the good of man.[7]

As to the functions of the State and Government, according to Confucius, abundance of wealth is necessary before the people have the time and energy necessary to the cultivation of learning and virtue. He therefore approved that the State do all it can to bring about equitable distribution of wealth and the increase of wealth. In order to achieve these aims, the State may take positive measures to promote education and to establish codes of worship and social and economic regulation.

In regard to the requisites of government, Confucius pointed out that they are: sufficiency of food, sufficiency of military equipment, and the faith of the people in their government. Concerning this point, one of his disciples by the name of Tzû-k'ung further inquired:

> If it cannot be helped and one of these must be parted with, which of the three should be foregone first?
>
> 'The military equipment,' replied the Master.
>
> Tzu-k'ung again asked: 'If it cannot be helped and one of the remaining two must be parted with, which of them should be foregone?'
>
> Confucius replied, 'Part with the food. From ancient times death has been the lot of all men; but if the people have no faith in their rulers, there can be no State.'[8]

Evidently this sage stressed the fact that the faith of the people in government is the most important element in government. Without this, it would mean anarchy or confusion. Here arises the problem, how far should the Government exercise its power in governing its people? To this question, one must bear in mind that Confucius is not at all a pure idealist and far from being an Utopian. He does not give any arithmetical formula in stating what is the limitation of the governing power of the

[7] *Book of Change*, bk. I, chs. i, xi.

[8] *Confucian Analects* (translated by James Legge, Shanghai), bk. XII, ch. vii.

Government for he wishes that the government should settle its own problems according to existing exigencies and environment. He further compares the sovereign to the head of the family, which was, and to some extent still is, the basis of the State of China. He advocated a principle that the sovereign might do whatever he sincerely and honestly believed to be for the good of the people in very much the same way as the father would do for his children. His ideal state was similar to the paternalistic ideal found among some Westerns.

Though, on the one hand, Confucius tends to give discretionary powers to the Government in enforcing its policies, yet he emphasizes the power of man. He stated:

> The principles of the government of Wen and Wu are always displayed in the records—the tablets of wood and bamboo. But, when there are the right men, such a government flourishes; while without such men, such a government decays and ceases. With a good quality of men, the growth of government is rapid, just as vegetation is rapid in land of good quality. Therefore, the administration of government depends upon man.[9]

But it should be borne in mind that Confucius, while advocating able men to administer the Government, simply held the belief that these administrators were *Men Mu,* meaning the "shepherd of men." This is similar to our modern idea to call the governor, governors, or executives "public servants." Indeed, the whole Confucian political philosophy rests on the theory of political stewardship, and *vox populi, vox dei.* He also believed that the government should exist by the consent of the governed, for he considered that any government which does not possess the consent of the governed is illegal and contrary to the right standards. Therefore, the *Great Learning* states that "by winning the support of the people, the kingdom is won; by losing the support of the people, the kingdom is lost." [10]

[9] Translated by James Legge in the *Chinese Classics,* vol. I, p. 405.
[10] *Great Learning,* ch. X, sec. 5.

Turning from the viewpoints of political theory and the administration of government, let us now consider law and justice. The theory of Confucius does not depend solely on pure legalism as did most of the Western legalists such as Justinian. This Chinese sage inclined to think that law can only regulate the external behavior of man, but man's behavior depends on his mind. If the mind is made right, his behavior will be proper, and there will be no necessity of criminal justice under a perfect rule of virtue. He thought that the sense of shame would enable man to behave properly. Law is needed only in the age of practical politics. On account of Confucian influence in Chinese law, criminal law was practically the most prevalent law applied in the courts and civil was scarcely used.

Confucius was of the opinion that justice should begin from the government itself. Government should be rectified and founded on proper authorities, so that law and justice may attain their ends. Law and justice are only used to supplement education and virtues in rectifying those who are not intelligent enough to follow the golden mean and virtues.

Confucius in fact has touched many points of government and it would require several volumes to discuss in detail his theory of every governmental activity. He discussed or mentioned government control of demand and supply, government control of grain, government loans and public relief, taxation, and the like.[11] Besides, he noticed briefly the question of population, of immigration, transportation and social welfare in the Confucian Classics. In short he has touched practically every phase of government in theory and practice, and his theory has exerted a great influence in China in the past as well as at present.

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[11] Chen Huan-chang, *The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School* (2 vols., New York, Columbia University Press, 1911), vol. II.

PSYCHOLOGY TODAY

IT is a characteristic feature of new sciences that during their infancy they bewilderingly break up into multiple subdivisions, that they develop numerous divergent methodologies, and that, because of their mitosis, they tend temporarily to lose all intelligible relation with their fundamental aims. This quality is especially predicable of Experimental Psychology today. The last century has seen a startling ferment of activity in the psychological fields; but, unfortunately, this activity has been mostly lateral in direction—so much so that the new psychology seems to lack any semblance of that omniscience and vital relation to its proper object that is necessary for a science if it is to be ultimately true and effective. The recent advances in experimental psychology and psychological methodology have been almost phenomenal: psycho-physics, physiological psychology, psycho-analysis, animal psychology, functional psychology, mental measurement and a legion of other new methodological subdivisions of the science have amassed a ponderous bulk of factual material. But yet, despite the quantitative weight of all this information, the essential problem of the ultimate nature and destiny of man remains untouched. Today, we are no closer to an intelligent comprehension of the nature and destiny of man than we were at the inception of the new science. The new psychology has explored and recorded the periphery of man; but no matter how detailed this record may be, there is no escaping the judgment that it is still the periphery and not the essence.

This peripheral limitation is consequent upon the very nature of the new psychology: a nature which fundamentally consists in a transference of scientific methodology from mechanics and statics to the dynamic field of human action. The usage of such mechanical methodology necessarily implicates—whether expressed or not—the assumption that man is a mechanism. A mechanism subject to statistically and empirically gathered

generalizations. In a certain sense the assumption is valid enough, because there are definite physical, chemical, biological and mechanical elements in man's constitution. But precisely because these elements are such as they are, they constitute in man only the accidental, the peripheral, the phenomenal. No matter or manner of exhaustive study of the biological and chemical aspects of the lachrymal phenomenon, no extent of psycho-analytic investigation and probing into the conscious and sub-conscious pathological basis of depression will ever penetrate to the ultimate human foundation of the pain and beauty of tears.

The error associated with this transference of methodology from the natural to the human sciences has taken on two distinct forms in the modern world. On the one hand, the error consists in an unnecessary exclusion of the psychologist from an unprejudiced approach to the study of his object because of his peculiar, narrow methodology. The psychologist who begins his investigations with the postulation of a mechanical method, and the injection of mechanical formulations, is necessarily limited thereby to only those aspects of his object which are mechanical and amenable to the scientific method. If there are extra-mechanical aspects in man's nature, the new psychologist will never attain to them because they are outside the perception-range of his intruments. The initial imposition of a mechanical method on an essentially dynamic object—man—peremptorily excludes all possibility of ever achieving even the knowledge that the object is dynamic. And no exhaustive compilation of mechanical data will ever get the psychologist further than this—unless he discards his method.

This bodily translation of methodology from the natural sciences to the study of man has been typical of the modern movement. As a result we have been presented with a wealth of factual information; but all of it—however true and enlightening it may be—is concerned only with the superficies.

Scientific psychology has got us nowhere as regards ultimate essential constituents.

On the other hand, in the few instances where experimental psychology has offered the world an intimation of the fundamental construction and meaning of human nature, it has grossly overstepped its grounds. It is legitimate—though as we have indicated above, unnecessarily confining from the beginning—for the psychologist to initiate his observations with a mechanical methodology. This legitimacy extends, however, only as far as the psychologist limits himself to the mechanical aspects of man. But once he departs from this self-imposed partition, either by asserting that his discoveries are the *whole* truth about the *whole* man, or that there is no other aspect than the mechanical in man, then he ceases to be reliable. And such has been the case many times during the history of modern experimental psychology. The exaggerated conclusions of the self-conscious schools—Wundt's physiological psychology, American introspectionism, Behaviorism, functional psychology, and Gestalt psychology—all bear testimony to the indictment. As scientific methods dealing with specific, defined objects, these schools are of no little value; but once they presume to objects not amenable to their methodology and still propose conclusions, then there is great error and little permanent value achieved.

II.

So far we have been engaged in establishing the peripheral character of the new psychology in its manifest activity. But the evaluation cannot stop there, for the new science rests on a certain broad assumption which it has carried over from the old metaphysical psychology. An assumption which by its very fundamental character anticipates and in a certain degree is responsible for the current misdirection of anthropology. And since this assumption is so tacit and unconscious in the modern mind, it is necessarily elusive and resistant to formulation.

Since it has its roots far back in the beginning of Western anthropological thought, it is best traced back to its origins for illumination.

The psychological and anthropological studies of the Western world since the age of Plato and Aristotle have revolved about the proposition, "Man is a rational animal." Always, in some form or another, this thesis has been the central point of departure in any and every theory of the nature and destiny of man. There have been those schools of thought (Aristotelianism and Thomism in particular) which have accepted the proposition as stated, and have builded their psychologies around it. Then there have been the materialistic and mechanistic anthropologies which have stressed the element of animality to the exclusion of the other element: and with this principle as the foundation of their constructions, have developed their monistic systems. And on the other hand, there have been those who have negated the animal element in favor of an emphasis on the spiritual and the rational: thus the historic angelisms and spiritualistic psychologies. Contemporary thought, for the most part, tends lately to favor the original concept of the duality of man's nature. Despite several pronounced deviations, the modern mind tends to accept "man is a rational animal." The leading psychologists and thinkers of the age seem to be turning away more and more from the bankrupt Materialism of the Nineteenth Century. To use the words of Dostoevsky, we are increasingly realizing "that men are still men, and not the keyboards of pianos over which the hands of nature may play at their sweet will . . . man is a man and not an organ handle."

While it is very gratifying to the traditionalist and the intelligent mind that the intellectual world is returning to psychological dualism, it is also true that such a renaissance casts dismaying shadows before it. For just as the traditional metaphysical conception of man's dual nature was abused by its adherents, so, too, it presently seems to be on the verge of con-

tinued misapplication. The misapplication consists simply in this: it is all very well to say that the ultimate metaphysical constitutive principles of man, which set him apart from all other things in the universe, are rationality and animality; but, when these two constituent elements are given as the complete nature of man, then the fallacy sets in. According to strict logic, a metaphysical definition gives only the ultimate genus (animality) and the specific difference (rationality); thus man is abstractly contradistinguished by this technique from angels, beasts, boats, and so forth. This is all that a metaphysical definition proposes to accomplish: it never attempts to make explicit the complete, the vital nature of the concretely existing object. Yet strangely enough, the history of Western thought shows an almost universal acceptance of this definition as the ultimately final concept of the total fundamental nature of man.

The point I wish to make is a rather difficult one, for in the first place, it goes against our whole traditional conceptual scheme (and is especially handicapped by the limitations of the language in which we have been accustomed to express this conceptual scheme); and secondly because it deals with the most intangible, dynamic and elusive depths of man's nature. Some years ago, J. Middleton Murry, in an essay, *The Need of a New Psychology*, somewhat vaguely expressed the same idea. In this paper, he complained against the handling of man's dynamic nature in the static abstractions of "rational animality"; and against the similar abstract conception, "man is an animal with a soul." On this point, Mr. Murry has this to say:—"But see where we have got to. Our search through European history for an answer to the question has brought us to the point at which we started. Man is a rational animal—that belief has brought us to disaster. Man is an animal with a soul—that belief has compelled revolution. The first is the psychology of the old individualism; it believes that man has the power to decide by the free use of his intellect what is good for himself and his fellows and to pursue

it. For the best part of the time man does nothing of the kind; he decides nothing for himself, he follows his leader who follows his; like sheep through a hedge. The psychology of the old individualism collapsed on the fact of the crowd. It did so 2,300 years ago in the Peloponnesian War; it collapsed again in the European War. That man is an animal with a soul is the psychology of the crowd; it maintains that man is essentially a creature of base impulses, from the consequences of which he can be saved only by the miracle of vicarious sacrifice. It collapses, has collapsed on the fact of individualism; man in the long run does insist on trying to be the master of his fate."

While Mr. Murry is none too exact in his thinking on this point, there is this much to his credit that he does realize the incompatibility between the abstract, static formula and the dynamic actions of the concretely existing man. From the observation of the contradictory, irrational, antinomian actions of men, one is forced to conclude that the definition is patently alien to its subject.

And yet, it cannot be denied that there is much truth in these two traditional formulations of which Mr. Murry speaks. Man certainly has an intellect which sets him off from the beast; and he has a soul which marks him off from the inert earthly element. So much is indisputable. The error of the old psychology lies mostly in this that it accentuates the constitutive elements to the complete disregard of the fact and the nature of the *composition.*

The historical corollary of the propositions (man is a rational animal, and man is an animal with a soul) has been to ascribe man's debility, ignorance and immorality to his animality. But is this really the actual case? On the contrary, an observation of the animal kingdom reveals a definite regularity and naturally legalized teleological system of conduct. Animals follow a very definite line of action and being: there is a specific periodicity in their sexual actions (there is no evidence at all of the promiscuity that is supposed); their man-attributed belligerency and

predatoriness is a myth. What gives rise to the sinfulness and immorality in man can not be so facilely ascribed to his animality; but in all truth, it must be admitted that it has its roots in the *composition* of animality with mentation and spirituality. And not so much in the fact of the composition, but rather in the inconceivable interstices existing between the intermingling constitutive elements. Deep down in the " strange twilight land of rational consciousness " where rationality, animality and spirituality coalesce and live and mingle is where the true basis of immorality has its being; where the quintessential nature of man is to be found. This is the *Underworld* which was the life-long study of Dostoevsky. The *Underworld* which is the source of man's strange, wilfull being. Somewhere in its contrapuntal rhythms of crossing contradictory currents of being lies the explanation of the mystery of man.

On the whole, we as observers of the unpredictable actions of ourselves as men, are led to the Greco-Pauline teaching of the three-fold composition in man of mind, body, and spirit; but reaching here, we are forced to conclude that the essence of the meaning of man is not to be found in these elements themselves but in their mysteriour commingling. This fantastic *Undgrung* (to use the terminology of the German Mystics) where three different worlds interpenetrate and have their individual being in a single being, is the real nature of man. And by its very contradictory, mysterious nature, this fantastic underworld can be subject to no mathematical or mechanical formulations, no more than it can be defined in static abstract concepts. The only passage to it is by individual, empirical insight into the actions and being of individual men. Because of the fact that man is an individual, and strives always to emphasize his individuality (even to the point of denying his reason, his very being), universal laws—whether metaphysical, mathematical or mechanical—are excluded.

III.

If the superscribed evaluation of the progress of psychology is true, then the case for the explanation of the nature and destiny of man would seem to be pathetic. And, unhappily, this vital problem is made all the more painfully difficult by reason of the fact that the world has lost sight of ultimate meanings and essentials on a cosmic scale. Competent writers on all sides are betraying disillusionment in the purposefulness of life. The recent war was the "strong wind" that blew down the decaying, moribund fences of the Nineteenth Century. We seem to puddle away our lives in a wasteland that has no god, no meaning. Man is more and more becoming an enigma to himself in an enigmatic world.

Of course, the dilemma is not entirely hopeless. At least we must assume it is not and thus press forward, or despair of a solution and thus be logically forced to actualizing Macbeth's soliloquoy on suicide. The former doubtlessly is the intelligent position. For to say dogmatically and finally that we can never know the meaning of man and man's life is to fatuously reach a conclusion that cannot be logically maintained. Only an objective, omniscent observer who can see all things at one time, and see them in their quintessence and totality could possibly be in a position to assert such a decisive negation. Obviously, man is no such observer; he ever is his own limited actuality.

On the other hand, we can—and in the face of the contemporary crisis are forced to—say that the comprehension is difficult. But difficulty is not impossibility. Several definite constructive suggestions immediately present themselves as prologommena to a reconstruction of psychology.

In the first place, the psychologist must be wary of borrowing analogous methods from other sciences. Many interesting facts concerning the bio-chemical, reflexatory and neural aspects of humanity may be gleaned by the use of methods similar to those

used in animal psychology. Yet, however interesting these facts may be, there still remains the reminder that they, after all, deal with only one element of man. The same holds true for all translated methodologies. Man is the most peculiar creation in the world; there is nothing analogous to him. And for this reason, knowledge about him can be attained only by the use of instruments and techniques proportionate to his unique nature.

Secondly, the psychologist would do well to approach his subject more dispassionately, more open-mindedly. He must seek less to cure immediately and more to discover ultimately. Of course there is much to be said in praise of the remedial work effected by the discoveries of abnormal psychology. The same holds true for the remarkable work accomplished by physiological psychology. This is all very good in its place; but yet it never does, nor ever can, tell the world anything concerning the ultimate basic nature of man. No matter how deep into the unconscious the remedial psychologist may penetrate for the roots of his patients' diseases, by the very nature of his work, and the instruments used, he can never pierce to the non-organic spiritual essence of man. This—be it understood—is by no means a rejection of the benefits of abnormal psychology: far from it. Let there be fruitful work done in this field; but only let the psychologist not overemphasize its importance to the exclusion of the fundamental question of the nature and destiny of man.

And finally, psychology must primarily strive to be what Nicholas Berdyaev calls, an " anthropology-in-motion in which things are seen in such an atmosphere of flame and ecstacy that they have meaning only for those who are themselves involved in the tempest." Mr. Berdyaev simply means that the psychologist, on recognizing the dynamism of man, must enter dynamically into the most active being of man, must emancipate the object from all environmental incidentals and to see him in his own free, individual, unrelated being; to see man in all his mysterious contradictory manhood. It serves no purpose to

explain man's nature and destiny by objective apriori definitions, or to study him in his superficial secular relationships (relationships to the material cosmos or to the social, physical and economic realities) : only in the segregated dynamism of man's free being, only in " the pitch darkness of man's innermost recesses," will the nature and destiny of man be discovered. All this calls for heroic investigation on the part of the psychologists; but the final goal is a consummation to be envied—indeed, the very effort itself, whether there be a final solution or not, is too intensely interesting and absorbing to be ignored. Nothing on the face of the earth is more wonderful than man: he is the greatest sublunary miracle and mystery.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Concept of Nature in Nineteenth-Century English Poetry. By JOSEPH WARREN BEACH. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936. Pp. xii + 618.

As a comprehensive treatise on an important and pivotal aspect of 19th century thought, this work belongs with such studies as those of Merz, Croce, Brandes and Mead; as an informative discourse on the idea of nature, regardless of period, it ranks with the similar disquisitions by Whitehead and by Lovejoy and by Boas. The author divides his book into four parts dealing with the concept of nature in the Romantics (Wordsworth, Shelley and Goethe), the Transcendentalists (Carlyle, Coleridge, Emerson and Whitman), the Victorians (Arnold, Tennyson, Browning, Swinburne and Meredith) and with the disappearance of the concept of nature in post-Victorians such as Hardy and some later writers.

The nature-poets were for the most part not orthodox Christians or "Fundamentalists" but deists, pantheists and free-thinkers who sympathized more with natural than with supernatural religion (p. 4). The key to our author's version of the poetic-metaphysic concept of nature and its import is as follows:

> The human mind cannot suddenly pass with ease and comfort from any form of faith to agnosticism and unbelief. It instinctively provides itself with means for easing off the emotional strain of such a transition. It provides philosophical bridges from faith to unfaith. And such a bridge was the romantic cult of nature, considered in the large. It made possible the passage without too great emotional strain from medieval Christian faith to the scientific positivism. . . . (p. 5)
>
> In the poetic concept of nature the elements derived from science and religion were maintained in a kind of equilibrium by the mediation of metaphysics. But it was at best precarious. . . . In the romantic period it was the preponderance of the religious element that caused the breakdown; in the Victorian period, that of the scientific element. (p. 7)
>
> Pantheism, as an interpreter of nature, is the meeting-ground of the older theological and the newer naturalistic philosophy. It is largely a question of main preoccupation and emphasis. Tennyson's main preoccupation is theological and his emphasis, as between nature and God, is upon God. (p. 429)

Wordsworth's metaphysical concept of nature is traced back to Cudworth, More, Berkeley and Newton. The doctrine of nature as bene-

volent is found in the Physiocrats Rousseau, Bishop Parker, Samuel Clarke, Cumberland, Godwin, Wordsworth and Shelley while the antithetical theory of nature as bad, cruel and destructive is championed by Tennyson, Arnold and Hardy.

Nature is sometimes conceived as all-inclusive (p. 399) but at other times it refers to the "world of things" as opposed to the moral world of man (pp. 398; 211). The natural law (of ethics) is sometimes identified with the laws of nature (of physical science) as by Young, Wordsworth and Shelley (pp. 82; 19). Nature is understood sometimes as "the unity of things personified" or as "the sum of natural laws" (p. 503). Carlyle is cited as quoting Novalis: "What is Nature? An encyclopedical, systematic Index or Plan of our Spirit" (p. 299).

When nature is not used in a comprehensive sense (p. 36) as opposed to God or as a substitute for God; it is often used as opposed to the artificial (pp. 17, 34, 37). The primitivistic legend of an Arcadian Golden Age, of the "noble savage," of corrupt society, of perverse and degraded civilization, of the tainted town, of the unspoiled peasant—this old tradition suited the distinction and opposition between the natural and the artificial as corresponding to that between country and town. The romantic cult of the out-of-doors, of natural scenery, of brooks and birds, of the wild and elemental forces of nature as opposed to the artificiality of cities, as in Byron and Cowper, was a common feature of this poetic philosophy. On the other hand, the idea of progress (the very opposite of primitivism) Shelley got from Godwin and Condorcet, leaving primitivism to Wordsworth, Southey and Byron.

Evolutionism is found in Tennyson, Swinburne and Meredith (p. 15) but not in Wordsworth (p. 207). The doctrine of the scale or chain of being is traced in Pope, Holbach, Leibnitz, King, Hale, Cheyne, Law, Baker, Thomson, Akenside, Coleridge and Wordsworth (pp. 107; 172; 14; 215) and partly in Shelley (p. 296). Pantheism is ascribed to Wordsworth, Southey, Emerson and Tennyson.

The reviewer would without hesitation label Shelley a pantheist (p. 585) despite the frequently nebulous line of demarcation between naturalism and pantheism and he would also suggest that the distinction between active and passive faculties is much older than implied (p. 136); Aristotle and the Scholastics preceded Sir Matthew Hale.

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La philosophie chrétienne jusqu'à Descartes. II. Des Alexandrins à la mort de saint Augustin. By B. ROMEYER. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1936. Pp. iv + 181.

This is the seventy-eighth volume offered by the publishers in the excellent *Bibliothèque catholique des sciences religieuses.* It is the second tome appearing in the section devoted to "Les bases rationnelles de l'enseignement catholique: Philosophie et Apologétique." Combining in a sense the views of MM. Blondel and Gilson, the author has defined "Christian Philosophy" in the first volume of this section (p. 19) as "*la philosophie même en tant que, perfectionnée dans son développement propre par le ferment spirituel de la dogmatique chrétienne, elle nous laisse encore nécessairement ouvert au surcroit divin de la vision intuitive.*" He envisages three periods in the development of this philosophy: *la période des données, celle de l'élaboration patristique, celle des systématizations scolastiques.* The volumes in this section do not correspond exactly to this division, and the present tome goes from Clement of Alexandria down to the death of St. Augustine.

The first chapter, devoted to Clement, is entitled "Christian Adolescence of Philosophy." Herein is outlined the content of his "philosophy" and what P. Romeyer calls his "contribution to the idea of Christian Philosophy." The next chapter, dealing with Origen, is captioned "Christian Youth of Philosophy," and is concerned mostly with a systematic exposition of the "Christian Philosophy" of the great Alexandrine apologete. A third chapter divides intervening writers down to Augustine into Origenists and anti-Origenists, and considers them from the aspect of their general agreement or disagreement with Origen's "Christian Philosophy." The final chapter, labeled "Christian Maturity of Philosophy," treats of the Latin predecessors of Augustine and the Bishop of Hippo himself.

Readers will find here a succinct, well documented account of the matter at hand, clearly divided and subdivided into paragraphs. Many of them, however, will object to the use of the term "Christian Philosophy," the definition given to it, and the straining of tenets necessary to make them fit into the framework of this terminology and ideology.

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The Liturgy of the Church. By DOM VIRGIL MICHEL. New York: Macmillan, 1937. Pp. viii + 369.

The sixteen chapters which form the contents of this book are the development of a 'series of lectures delivered at the Pius X School of Liturgical Music, New York City, in the summer of 1936.' The matter treated here may be said to center round four main themes: the meaning of Liturgy in general, the liturgical year, the sacraments and the divine office. Thus the author has endeavored to introduce the reader to practically all the main problems of Liturgy. He has not tried to give here a personal study, but rather to gather within the compass of one volume what may be considered to be finally established results. There is doubtless much prudence in maintaining liturgical vulgarization within the 'safety-zone.' That this was the preoccupation of the author may be easily gathered from the bibliography which seems purposely limited to a few major works, articles of dictionaries or encyclopedias and some popular booklets and pamphlets, and also from the fact that his main authorities are Dom Festugière and Dom Gréa, of venerable memory but of long date.

The popular character of the book did not allow the author to enter deeply into the matter. But 'popularity' in treating of difficult and vast problems may cause a certain lack of stringency, a certain lameness, which are only too characteristic of the liturgical movement particularly in the English-speaking countries. We ought to beware more of yielding to the profoundly un-Christian—and hence unliturgical—anti-intellectualism of our age. Moreover, the liturgical movement is sufficiently widespread for us to see that the situation is no longer one of isolated apostles among barbarians. Thus for minds no longer in the inaugural state—and they are not few—this book will leave many a problem unsolved. No indefinite accumulation of affirmations will ever induce a responsible soul to change its fundamental attitude toward life. That requires deep and austere investigations into the first causes. Then, have we a right to draw and impose conclusions that exceed our premises? An instance of this may be found in the following. The author accepts the definition of Liturgy as the exterior worship of the Church (p. 2). As such he makes Liturgy a mere subdivision of the moral virtue of religion (p. 3), that is of a virtue whose perfection is not absolute, but relative. To this kind of virtue we must apply the *virtus in medio stat*: it supposes the possibility of too much and too little. But at the end of the same chapter Liturgy has already

become 'the life of the Church' (p. 19), and this second definition is the real base of all the author's ulterior developments. But of life it cannot be said that its perfection *inmedio stat*, nor that it is the subdivision of a moral virtue, nor even that it is a virtue at all. Life is the base and source of all virtues, even theological, it underlies and transcends all habits (virtues) and operations, in a living being it is indeed identical with substantial being itself (S. Th. Ip., q. XVIII, art. 2, c.). Suspended between two (and there are more) so widely distant views of the nature of Liturgy, we lack the base of one sole fundamental notion, and consequently give only a half-hearted consent to all that follows. Thus all those notions of worship, religion, priesthood, mediation, participation, fellowship, religious experience loom in a mist where one hardly dares to move. Liturgy is something very deep and very vast, and something *sui generis*. It did not preside over the theological fabric constructed at the end of the Middle Ages by the great schoolmen. Therefore we think it impossible to give an adequate description of Liturgy by detaching a few bricks from the scholastic building to build up a new conception. The scholastic system and the liturgical system are both organisms which can only be profitable to each other if left in their entirety. Therefore we must study Liturgy not with ready made scholastic notions, but with the help of the lines or fundamental principles of Scholastic philosophy. The truly 'scholastic' method of studying Liturgy would be to install ourselves in the very heart of the Liturgy, to observe, to connect and to elaborate from that observatory, with a scholastically trained outlook and with one eye on the scholastic system which we must develop, not contradict. In the case of a book of vulgarization all this is said obviously in a spirit of friendly suggestion, not of reproach.

Moreover, under the ashes of worn-out definitions there smoulders in this book the fire of a genuine understanding of Liturgy. Not only has one often to smile in admiration of well-directed practical reminders, but there are here and there passages where the author succeeds in welding vulgarization to profoundness and grand vistas. This is especially true where he shows the 'natural' base of liturgical symbolism (p. 74 ff.), where he points out how the finiteness of human nature demands a *gradual* progress and a many-sided elaboration throughout time and space in regard to human perfection. "Our nature ever remains finite, no matter how intimate and abundant is its participation in the divine life. It can never grasp this life adequately or in its totality in the course of any year, not even in the course of a life-

time, even while, just because it is finite, it is capable of ever realizing more than it does at any one time. Hence, again, it is admirably in harmony with our human nature that the liturgical cycle is repeated year after year, just as the divine sacrifice is repeated in the Church day after day" (p. 90). There lies here a possibility for a fine study of spirituality, liturgical and individualistic, from the point of view of Christian humanism.

On the whole the book seems to suit admirably its practical purpose, and one cannot but wish a widespread diffusion. It makes straight many a path, many a valley is filled, many a mountain and hill is brought low.

THEODORE WESSELING.

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La Pensée Religieuse de Montaigne. By MATURIN DREANO. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne et ses Fils, 1936. Pp. 502.

One of the most difficult characters of the sixteenth century to understand is Michael Eyquem de Montaigne. That he was a Christian who accepted implicitly all the doctrines of the Church can hardly be doubted. That he was also something of a skeptic and libertine is likewise generally admitted. To reconcile these divergent and even contrary qualities and to determine exactly the nature of the Christianity of Montaigne is the difficult task undertaken by the writer. Three possible viewpoints are suggested by the author; the view of some that Montaigne was a Christian like the humanists of his time, who believed and lived to some extent at least as a Christian without actually permitting religion to dominate his life; the second the viewpoint of others such as Dr. Armaingaud, who looked upon Montaigne as a secret enemy of the Christion religion whose external religious practices and utterances were anything but sincere; finally the contention of those who consider Montaigne an earnest Christian.

The picture of Montaigne drawn in these pages seems to sustain this third position. He receives a most sympathetic treatment from the writer, who, it must be admitted, makes out a very fair case for him. The conclusions of the author, throughout the book are supported by texts from the writings of Montaigne, the Essays particularly. The lives and writings of his contemporaries, notably Etienne de la Boetie,

are examined to determine their influence upon his life and to discover the reputation he enjoyed in their eyes.

Certainly his ancestry and environment were calculated to make Montaigne a sincere Christian. Despite his rather liberal views on freedom of conscience, his attitude toward the Reformation and his defense of the Catholic Church would seem to place his sincerity and Christianity beyond doubt. Like Pierre Bunel of whose farsightedness he speaks in his essays, he considered the Reformation as a momentary pause between Catholicism from which it comes and atheism into which ultimately it degenerates.

It is only when he treats of the skepticism or Pyrronism of Montaigne that the problem of conciliation becomes almost unsolvable for the author. His contention that the skepticism of Montaigne was confined entirely to the natural order and in no way affected his faith in the supernatural, may be accepted. That solution however does not reach the problem. Faith in the theological sense of the word is incompatible with just that natural skepticism.

The conclusions of the author are perhaps as definite as could be expected regarding so elusive a character as Montaigne. The facts are set forth in an orderly, readable fashion, without any attempt to distort them. It is an objective, honest account of the life and works of the French writer. Much is left to the logic and judgment of the reader.

Of most interest to Catholics perhaps is the conclusion of the fourth book in which the author turns his attention to the "Essays and the Index." Various possibilities are mentioned as to the reason for the inclusion of the Essays in the Index of forbidden books. As has already been said regarding the book in general, the conclusions on this point again are vague and indefinite. In this phase particularly the book falls somewhat short of what might reasonably be expected in a work that sets out to describe the nature of the religious thought of Montaigne.

JAMES W. O'BRIEN.

The Catholic University of America.

The Tradition of Boethius: A Study of His Importance in Medieval Culture. By HOWARD ROLLIN PATCH. New York: Oxford University Press, 1935. Pp. viii + 200.

Anyone who has turned the pages of Manitius with an eye for the constantly recurring name of Boethius will realize what a formidable

task confronted the author of this work—and Manitius by no means gets down through the Middle Ages. One opens this slender volume with misgivings, but they are soon dispelled, for Professor Patch has handled his subject surprisingly well.

The book is written with a view of giving students an idea of the present status of research on the Nachleben of Boethius, but the author has gone far beyond that and incorporated a great deal of his own research. Most of the work is devoted to the tradition of the *De Consolatione Philosophiae*; that of Boethius' other writings is sketched very briefly.

The first chapter deals with the life of Boethius and the legends concerning it. The facts are few, but one is inclined to agree with the author and in the absence of more details assume from the saintliness and good sense which mark the influence of Boethius through the centuries that he himself was like that.

The second chapter, headed "Medieval Thought," deals with the general indebtedness of the Middle Ages to Boethius. It tries to give some idea as to the number of manuscripts of Boethius in circulation and lists the mediaeval commentaries on him. In considering the place of Boethius in mediaeval education the author realizes that the subject is one for several volumes. He nevertheless courageously attempts a preliminary sketch. He can only touch upon the importance of Boethius' versions and commentaries in the tradition of Aristotle. The impatiently awaited Lacombe catalogue will greatly increase our knowledge on this point. The chapter treats the influence of Boethius on the trivium and quadrivium, on the problem of universals, on the problems of chance, free will, and grace. His social influence is hinted at.

For the third chapter Professor Patch has despoiled many monographs to write delightfully about the "Translations of the Consolatio." In his fourth chapter he has combed Latin, Romance, and English literature for imitations and influence of the same work. In both chapters he gets well down into the modern period.

Some forty pages of notes given in an appendix convey an idea of the magnitude of the author's task. There are twenty pages of bibliography. Seven plates reproduce illuminations from mediaeval manuscripts.

This book will surely stir up further study of Boethius and incidentally it will probably set more people to reading the *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, a book which Dante feared was "not known to many."

A. K. Ziegler.

The Catholic University of America.

Le Procès contre Thomas Waleys O. P.: étude and documents. By Th. Kappeli, O. P. (Dissertationes historicae fasc. VI.) Romae: Instituto storico Domenicano, S. Sabina, Aventino, 1936. Pp. 251.

This book offers an interesting study in church history and the history of theology. Thomas Waleys, an English Dominican, opposed the new views in regard to the beatific vision which John XXII propounded as a private theologian. Because of his own violence and the no little *odium theologicum* of the time, Waleys was summoned before the Inquisition. A number of the doctrines attributed to him were questioned or condemned, especially his assertion that the resurrection of the body and the last judgment will take place at one and the same instant. Nothing was said about his views on the beatific vision. Waleys defended himself valiantly; he complained that he had not been accorded a fair trial and finally appealed to the Pope. In the meantime Philip VI of France had become interested in his favor. He was now tried before a commission of Cardinals, but it appears that the case was never settled and Waleys was long detained in confinement.

In eighty introductory pages Father Kappeli gives the interesting history of the case and the various phases of the trial, bringing out points hitherto neglected by historians. Over one hundred and fifty pages are devoted to an edition of the documents on both sides of the cases, none of which has previously been edited in full. An anonymous apology for Waleys, written presumably in Paris, is given in résumé because of its length.

A. K. Ziegler.

The Catholic University of America.

Laurentii Pignon catalogi et chronica; accedunt catalogi Stamsensis et Upsalensis scriptorum O. P., cura G. Meersseman O. P. (Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum historica Vol. XVIII). Romae: Institutum historicum Fratrum Praed. ad S. Sabinae, 1936. Pp. xxii + 134.

The indefatigable Father Meersseman gives us herewith editions of several valuable instruments of research in the field of mediaeval Dominicana and allied subjects. Most important are two works of Laurentius Pignon, O. P. Around the beginning of the fifteenth century Pignon composed a *Catalogus fratrum spectabilium Ordinis fratrum Praedicatorum* listing the saints, dignitaries, masters, provincials in

France, and the distinguished scholars of his order. About the same time he composed a chronicle of the Dominican general chapters and the provincial chapters of France. These sources were much used by Quétif-Echard. The works are extant in a unique manuscript full of errors and very difficult to read. The manuscript has never previously been edited and the citations from it in Quétif-Echard swarm with errors.

There follows an edition of the celebrated fourteenth century catalogue of Stams containing a list of the writings of the early Dominicans. It emends the previous edition of Denifle. Next we have a corrected edition of the fifteenth century catalogue of similar nature found in a manuscript of Upsala.

In the appendices Father Meersseman offers first an edition of the catalogue of the Dominican provincial priors in France composed by Bernard Gui; then he gives accurate chronological lists, founded on his own wide research, of the Dominican provincial chapters and priors of France through the Middle Ages. There is a concordance of names as they appear in the various catalogues and a further index of the names of other persons mentioned in the volume.

A. K. Ziegler.

The Catholic University of America.

Principles of Educational Psychology. By W. D. Commins. New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1937. Pp. xiv + 596.

Both the philosopher and the educator have long desired a source book into which they could dip for the data of educational psychology. Dr. Commins presents us with a work which meets this need and adds to the data systematic thought and consistent organization. From the many trends in biological and psychological thought, Dr. Commins has sought to gather those which converge and from them extract certain basic concepts. These concepts he applies to the psychology of education. He sees clearly the need of understanding the methods of scientific analysis in order to have an intelligent approach to the problems of mental development, learning, and others which confront the educator. From a wide range of reading and his own teaching experience, Dr. Commins has succeeded in giving us a book which for all practical purposes is complete in its field. Tables and illustrations are found in considerable number. No important topic is overlooked.

There are nineteen chapters. The trend of the book can readily be seen by citing a few of the chapter headings: Three chapters deal with ability, its measurement and growth. Three more deal with intelligence. Learning and the processes that go into it cover four chapters. These are followed by several chapters on thought and the development of personality. A final chapter deals with personality problems in relation to school adjustment. This is one of the best chapters in the book.

On such subjects as Mental Tests, the philosophy of Dr. Commins is wholly sound. Mental tests, he says, however accurate they may be can go only so far in enabling us to classify a child. They offer us a measuring scale but it is a continuous one. They cannot give us classification itself. In tracing the causes of ability the normal curve suggests that ability is due to a large number of causative factors. It may even be conceived that we have in the setting for mental development the source of the innumerable factors postulated by the laws of chance. It had already been pointed out by T. V. Moore [1] that

> The ability of the individual of today may be regarded as due to a very great number of elementary primordial causes, each contributing a very small fraction to the individual's ability and each primordial cause uncorrelated with every other primordial cause.

In the coöperation of the primordial causes order can be found. The psychologist seeks the causes of ability in humanly significant groupings of chance elements, such as heredity, genetically priorability, method of teaching, motivation through rivalry, and parental attitude. A distinction is drawn between causes taken in a quantitative and qualitative sense. In the quantitative sense cause is a factor which in its own variation affects the variation of something else. In the genetic or qualitative sense a prior mental act, an insight, a desire, a discrimination, an intention, are causes of ability.

To write an adequate criticism of this book is impossible in a review. It is a book that will be found invaluable by educators. It demands the attention also of philosophers. The results of a generation of educational and psychological experiment are embodied in it. The author index contains every name of importance in this science. The book is valuable both for the teacher and the learner. A few hours' careful study of the pages dealing with "Learning to Think" are more profit-

[1] "Formal Causality and the Analysis of Mental Life," *J. Educ. Psychol.*, 1934, *25*, 401-421.

able than days or weeks devoted to excursions into the literary field which abounds with books on self training and the art of thinking.

The social worker also will find in the chapter on Personality and School Adjustment a great deal of helpful material. Emotional attitudes, the neurotic child, various personality factors in their relative importance are topics of lively interest to the social worker as well as to the educator. We have to thank Dr. Commins for an eminently practical book.

F. A. WALSH.

The Catholic University of America.

This Creature, Man. By JAMES FRANCIS BARRETT. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1936. Pp. xvi + 364.

It is safe to say that at no other time in the history of human knowledge, has there been a more general interest manifested in psychological problems, than there is in our own time. This is due in no small measure to the ever increasing volume of psychological literature which has been more-or-less indiscriminately foisted upon the general public since the turn of the century. Much of the present literature of a psychological nature is unscientific, and hence, worthless; and as a rule what is scientific is so technical that only a few who have special training in the field are capable of analysing its content.

Hence, because of the high degree of interest in psychology, and because of the increasing demand for the principal psychological facts which science has uncovered throughout the course of the centuries, there has been created a very real need for a reliable, and yet popular, presentation of the subject.

Father Barrett, student and teacher of psychology as well as a keen observer of the trends of thought along this line, readily saw this need and answered it with the final work of his rather short life, *This Creature, Man.*

The work falls into two parts, the first of which studies man from a point of view of his mental powers and their operations, while the second division of the treatise is devoted to a logical presentation of the facts pertaining to the very nature of the human soul and its relation to the body.

The author is thoroughly catholic in his views and his selections. But, as he points out himself (p. 343), truth must be the primary

object in any study, and hence we care not what might be its source; 'we are glad to learn the results of every method of study and to give every theory a fair test.'

Father Barrett evidently had two objects in view when he wrote; one, to set down clearly and concisely the chief psychological principles, and the other, to present them in a manner the layman would understand. Perhaps it was too great zeal in trying to carry out the latter of these objectives that led him to make the following unqualified and rather too dogmatic statement in his prologue: ". . . but the fact is that no evidence of an evolutionary origin of the human body exists" (p. 18). Obviously the author was out of sympathy with any theory of human evolution or he would have made a more careful review of the facts relative to that question. In view of the facts that have thus far been uncovered by some of the leading scientists in the fields of embryology and anthropology, we must admit that there is at least some evidence for the evolutionary hypothesis, whether we choose to subscribe to it or not.

However, as a whole, the work is excellently done. Written in simple language, *This Creature, Man* must necessarily have a wide appeal. Besides, the wealth of facts on the nature of man that comprises its content makes it an invaluable asset to everyone who seeks a deeper knowledge of self and fellowmen. The author has treated a popular subject in a popular way.

S. M. Killeen.

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Die Prophetie. By Abraham Heschel. Kraków: Naktadem Polskiej Akademiji Umiejetności, 1936. Pp. vi + 194.

The present monograph, written in German, constitutes No. 22 of the series of memoirs of the Orientalist Commission of the Polish Academy of Sciences of Cracow, Poland. The author tells us that he is not concerned with the explanation of prophetical teachings, but only with their description as facts of consciousness. He argues that the act of prophesying does not occur in the state of ecstasy, neither may it be compared to the creative activity of the poets. It is what he calls pathos, which supplies the content of the prophetical inspirations. Hence the third part of his book treats of what he denominates pathetic theology, since God appears to the prophets as a pathetic God, an angry

God, owing to men's reprehensible conduct. The author gives the problem of the anger of God special consideration. The prophet's attitude toward the divine pathos is that of sympathy. The prophetic activity is motivated by God's disappointment with His people. The writer contends that God's pathos, as directed toward men, constitutes the object of the prophet's cognition. One must acknowledge that the author has contributed a highly original study of the prophetic office, which has played such a powerful rôle in the history of religion.

J. J. Rolbiecki.

The Catholic University of America.

Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis. By Otto Schilling. Munich: Max Hueber, 1937. Pp. 416.

This work is a translation of the first volume of the *Lehrbuch der Moral-theologie* published in 1928 by Dr. Otto Schilling of the University of Tübingen. The very favorable reception accorded to the *Lehrbuch* has led the author to prepare a Latin version, in order to make it available for a wider audience of students.

Dr. Schilling is best known to us for his many scholarly contributions to the fields of Social Ethics and Political Economy, treating these in the light of the doctrine of St. Thomas Acquinas. The sound metaphysical background and analytical acumen which characterized his treatment of these problems is evidenced in the present volume.

After an extensive introduction, we have a logical division of the subject matter *De Ordine Morali* into three sections. The first treats of the *Ratio et Principia Ordinis Moralis*, the second of the *Violatio Ordinis Moralis per Peccatum*, and the third section concludes the work, with the study of the *Restitutio Ordinis Moralis per Christum*. This last section presents in sixty pages a concise treatment of *De Sacramentis*, which most authors expand into a large volume.

Dr. Schilling has had a two-fold purpose guiding him in his preparation of the present text. He has sought to treat the subject-matter in a true Thomistic light, averring that many textbooks of Moral Theology are dominated by the methods of Casuistry, despite claims to present the subject *ad mentem Sancti Thomae*. Secondly, he has striven to prepare a text not burdened with a mass of heterogeneous matter, belonging properly to other branches of Theology or to Canon Law. He has succeeded admirably in his purpose and presents a clear, logical

and concise development of the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor in the field of Moral Theology. The translation of the second volume, which will complete the work, is in preparation and will be published shortly.

F. A. WALSH.

The Catholic University of America.

Summa Theologiae Moralis: De Principiis. By B. H. MERKELBACH. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer et Cie, 1936. Vol. 1, 2nd ed. Pp. 786.

The first edition of Dr. Merkelbach's Moral Theology (cf. *The New Scholasticism*, Vol. VI, no. 3, July 1932, p. 277) was greeted by wide acclaim. Little need be added to commend the new edition. It remains substantially the same excellent work. About thirty new pages have been inserted, most of them devoted to an exhaustive index by Fr. Van Langenhove. The lack of such an index in the former edition, together with the author's personal arrangement of topics, made consultation of the text difficult. The defect is now removed completely. For the most part, the other changes consist of minor modifications in the wording of the text. The only noticeable revision concerns the question of mental disorders and their influence upon freedom and responsibility. The author now clearly distinguishes between physiogenic and psychogenic diseases (pp. 96 ss.). The recognition of functional disorders brings the text into closer alignment with Psychiatry and Mental Hygiene. Many would gladly see the moralist proceed further along this line. But it is at least a step in the right direction. On the whole, a very fine work has been made even better.

JOHN F. FINNEGAN.

The Catholic University of America.

Personal Realism. By JAMES BISSETT PRATT, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937. Pp. xi + 387.

Professor Pratt has always been regarded as a philosopher with basic common sense. This quality shows itself in many places in his new study of personal realism. We can follow him through most of it; he is dualistic enough to be a Scholastic, but he is not sure enough of his dualism to be a philosopher. In concluding his book he says: "I think these beliefs and over-beliefs of mine are probable. I think, on the whole, they are more consistent with the facts and more inwardly

plausible, than any of the rival hypotheses. They are not certain. As Xenophanes said, 2500 years ago, 'There never was nor will be a man who has clear certainty about the gods and about all things; for even if he does chance to say what is true, yet he himself does not know that it is so. But all are free to guess. These are guesses something like the truth.'" Aristotle would never have defined philosophy as the science of ultimate guesses.

Professor Pratt examines various forms of realism both with and without dualism. He is right in concluding that no form of realism can dispense with dualism. He devotes an entire chapter to an attempt at finding a representational form of realism which will avoid John Locke's pitfall of subjectivism. This terminates by narrowing down the choice to Realism and Absolute or Personal Idealism. Professor Pratt says that the question between them is one of relative probability. He doubts whether this question can ever be settled with objective certainty. His own system has long been known by the name of Personal Realism. It is readily recalled that he was one of the original group of Critical Realists. He tells us in his autobiography (in Contemporary American Philosophy) of the failure of his attempt to be an idealist after the manner of Royce or Hegel. He could not assure himself that either the realist or the idealist could fully prove his point; he was won over to realism as the more probable philosophy. In 1916 at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association he came out openly for realism.

The genesis of the term Realism is found in his book entitled *Matter and Spirit* (p. 215) where, after refuting personal idealism, he says:

> So great respect have I for the Absolute that I mean to take no chances and to come nowhere near him. To drop the figure it seems to me that what the times call for in philosophy is not a Personal Idealism but a Personal Realism,—a philosophy that should be frankly dualistic, a recognition of the fact to which unspoiled experience seems to point, that the world of matter and the world of spirit are not made of the same stuff.

Personal Realism, as the name indicates, is a dualistic philosophy. This dualist is fundamental. Its essential character was stated as follows:

> The antithesis between the mental and the physical is the most absolute antithesis within the realm of being.[1]

[1] *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIII, No. 25, p. 688. "Confessions of An Old Realist."

Even in this new study he looks upon the psycho-physical problem as the central issue in metaphysics. He had already discussed this problem in his *Matter and Spirit*. In this work he came to the conclusion that the solution must be found in Interactionism and a dualism of process. In Chapter XVIII he considers three objections to Interactionism and says that they do not seem to possess more than a trifling importance. These objections are the stock objections based on the partial dependence of consciousness upon physical conditions and the arguments from causation and the conservation of energy. He finds two processes in the world, the physical and the mental. The world cannot be explained through a single formula or through purely physical laws.

He had already put his objections to materialism in *Matter and Spirit* (p. 35 sq.). Materialism identifies consciousness with energy and denies mental efficiency. The materialist seek to give an explanation for everything under exact and unalterable law and make of the universe a closed system. Pratt insists that consciousness is independent of mechanical law, has an energy and efficiency of its own, which cannot be explained as we explain the energy and efficiency of a physical thing, and that the purpose and will that we see in men are not the mere working out of a formula.

Among the alternatives to materialism, parallelism has been proposed. In its simple form, he says, it has never been seriously held. To conceive mind and body flowing on as two separate beings in unfailing concomitance, without in any way dominating or influencing each other, is absurd. That "nerve process" does not mean conscious thought or emotion "should be plain in a kindergarten." The suggestion that mind and body are two aspects of a "Something-I-Know-not-what" is equally unacceptable. This Double Aspect view gets very little attention, for the simple reason that if mind is an aspect of matter and matter in turn an aspect of something which cannot be anything unless an aspect of matter, little progress is made toward solving the question. If this third something is unknowable how can it be postulated by philosophers or offered in explanation of anything.

Idealistic Parallelism and Pan-Psychism are equally objectionable. That every material object has a psychic center and that physical qualities are merely appearances is untenable. In Idealistic Parallelism and Pan-Psychism personal consciousness is the psychic center and is identical with the cerebral cortex. Professor Pratt points out that if this were true when consciousness disappears the cerebral cortex should

likewise vanish. The undeniable fact that a cortex can be found in the brain of a dead man wholly destroys this theory.

Professor Pratt is a realist, but of a special kind. A philosophy is realistic which maintains that being or reality exists independent of our consciousness of it. Professor Hocking one time described realism as "a disposition to keep ourselves and our judgment out of things, to let the objects speak for themselves." In his essay (already quoted) "Confessions of An Old Dualist" he gives us an exposition of dualistic realism. The physical, he says, is "that which has extension or position within our common objective, three dimensional space," while the psychical world is composed of "those non-physical entities which are existent only as functions of the experience of one or more individual persons or organism." In the present book in the Chapter on Knowledge and Self he insists on the distinction between mere thought or will and the reality of the self. "We must accept the reality of the self or go on to Naturalism and the suicide of thought." (p. 296, *Personal Realism*)

It has long been the opinion of Professor Pratt that consciousness (even of objects in space) can not be reduced to or contained in the common Euclidian space of the physical world.[2] Whatever the introspective psychologist shall find consciousness to be, it is certain that it shall be distinct from matter. The existence of unconscious, unperceived, physical objects occupying three dimensional space is perfectly conceivable. Some form of dualism, therefore, must always remain in philosophy. He divides the world of reality into two antithetical components; he must then seek the explanation of how these two types of being can affect and influence each other. His solution is an interaction theory.

Interaction is the theory most in harmony with our experience. Purpose, Will and the efficiency of Mind are facts. Pratt is not a Romanticist, but a common sense philosopher. With him interaction is a principle, not of division, but of relation. It is part of the general organic conception of the Cosmos. "The world," he says (page 273), "is a whole." He recognizes that there are difficulties in interactionism but they are not insoluble. In fact he has solved these difficulties in his Essays and other works. Against the materialist who argues that two such divergent realities as matter and spirit cannot affect one another

[2] *Journal of Phil.*, Vol. XIV, No. 10, p. 257, "Defense of A Dualistic Realist."

he brings an analysis of casuality. He agrees with Hume that it is impossible to arrive at cause by deduction. The only way we can know that one thing causes another is by observing it. Hence when the materialist asks us how can matter affect mind the answer is not an explanation of the "how" but the assertion of the fact. He proceeds to show that all experience points to interaction of mind and body. The fact that we can discuss this experience of causality is an evidence that it does occur.

The dualism of Professor Pratt is a dualism of Process; it is therefore a dualistic Realism. Professor Pratt has always held to epistemological dualism and in his dualism of Process he develops a genuine Psycho-Physical dualism. Consciousness cannot be a merely passing stream, nor can it be a kind of impersonal cosmic reservoir. It must be a self or personality. He devotes a chapter to the Nature of Self and concludes that the self is a substance with an identity of its own, a unity that possesses great variety.

Pratt says, (page 312):

> I think we do have the same kind of evidence for the existence of the self that we have for the existence of physical things; but I think we have also a kind of knowledge concerning the self that we do not have concerning any physical thing. Our knowledge of the self is in part based on inference, but it is not mere inference.

Indeed, while one could wish that Professor Pratt were just a little more explicit in his assertion of realism, the main thing in his system of philosophy appears to be the doctrine of the existence of the individual self or personality. This view, that there are individual, autonomous, efficient selves, which have a reality of their own, which are not mere matter and motion and which operate in the physical world by means of the body, is fundamental to the system. Pratt's philosophy, we see, is well named.

Since the days of Emerson, American philosophy has never been able to free itself from Oriental influences. Transcendentalism took deep root, so deep in fact that Nicholas Murray Butler in his opening address at the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, Harvard University, 1926, called Emerson "the greatest of American philosophers." Pratt, therefore, is not outside the American tradition when he interests himself in Oriental philosophy and religion. In one of his philosophical plays, in the collection, "Adventures in Religion and Philosophy," one of the characters (the character is the Reverend John Liberalis) speaking to a Buddhist monk about Buddhism and Christianity, says:

> Only what you call the impersonal Absolute, I would recognize as the living word of the Most High. . . . The Eternal Logos, greater indeed than flesh and blood but yet personal in some high sense of that great word. I would have the spirit of pity that was in Gotama and the great peace which he brought. . . . But I would have the spirit of energetic and efficient service and of universal self-forgetting love which was in Jesus . . . permeate all the land and live in every heart. And if this were done, it would matter very little whether we called the result Christianity or Buddhism—or, just the truth."

In the work we are reviewing (page 310), he draws upon the Sacred Books of the East for the words of Yajnavalkya:

> Thou couldst not see the seer of sight, thou couldst not perceive the perceiver of perception, thou couldst not know the knower of knowledge. This is thyself which is within all. Everything else is of evil.

Pratt has been unable to overcome the New England weakness for oriental mysticism. He would appear to embrace the idea that the self is not strictly knowable. He accepts, at least in part, the position of Yajnavalkya. In the end he asks the question, "Has human life any purpose, and if so, what is it?"

His answer shows that his philosophy still contains the elements of defeatism which are found in the makeup of all recent schools of philosophy. He says, "I do not pretend that philosophy—my philosophy at any rate—can answer this question." Professor Pratt would benefit greatly by reading the Prima Secundae, q. 1., a. 2., of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas.

F. A. Walsh.

The Catholic University of America.

Studies in the Life of Robert Kilwardby, O. P. By Ellen M. F. Sommer-Seckendorff. Institutum Historicum Fratrum Praedicatorum Romae ad S. Sabinae, Dissertationes Historicae, Fasc. VIII. Rome: Instituto Storico Domenicano, 1937. Pp. xviii + 191.

The subject of the present monograph has long been in need of a definitive biographical and philosophical study. His beginnings, like those of many a great personage of the medieval church, have remained clouded in conjecture bordering on mystery. The democracy of the church allowed the rise through ability from complete obscurity to a position of honor and distinction. Kilwardby studied at Paris and Oxford, became Provincial of the Dominican Order in England in

1261, Archbishop of Canterbury in 1272 and resigned this honor in 1278 to become Cardinal Bishop of Porto. He died in Viterbo in September 1279 after only a year and a half as Cardinal. He is perhaps best known for his condemnation of certain positions of the adherents of Thomas Aquinas similar to and a few days later than the severer condemnation of Bishop Stephen Tempier of Paris in March, 1277. Kilwardby was an Augustinian and, though a student of Aristotle, he rejected what he conceived to be the dangerous christianization of Aristotle accepted by a majority of his fellow-Dominicans. Such an independent-minded person deserves careful study. The author (hereafter designated SS) of the work before us, a Ph. D. thesis at Cambridge, deserves praise for having very evidently done a great deal of faithful investigation in the preparation of these studies. She has assembled facts and conjectures which have, in many cases, escaped previous students in this field. The title tells, by implication, the story of very incomplete sources. Kilwardby took with him when he went to Rome in 1278, after resigning the archbishopric, his register and all other relevant documents. They have since completely disappeared. We have therefore almost no documentation for the period of his archepiscopate, from most points of view the most important period of his life. This lamentable lack, combined with a great paucity of material for his earlier life, means that we can hardly construct anything approaching an adequate biography. SS has attempted gallantly the task of making as much of the remaining material as possible. She has had to seek far and wide for scraps of information, and often in vain. It must be said that she has shown much diligence in assembling this disparate material, but there are numerous details concerning which objection must be raised, either as to her facts or her relating of these facts. Then it is difficult to excuse the failure to use other data which would not have been impossible to control.

First as to details. On p. 6 SS assigns "his membership of the University of Paris with some precision to the twenties and possibly also to part of the thirties of the thirteenth century." But she has previously given good reason for doubting the validity of the sources upon which the period of the 1220's was posited. Her own reasoning makes the period 1230-1240 much more acceptable. The ascription of the *Tractatus de Quadrante* (p. 13), usually ascribed to a certain *Robertus Anglicus*, to John of St. Giles seems gratuitous. No reason is given (p. 16) *why* the *De Ortu Scienciarum* must have been composed while Kil-

wardby taught as a Master of Arts. The "Stamser Katalog" is quite inadequate for any summary of Kilwardby's writings without explicit textual corroborative evidence from MSS. We should be skeptical about such catalogues when they list conventional titles. They have value when they cite unusual titles, but otherwise must be used with great caution. To bracket Robert Bacon with Grosseteste as having exercised the greatest influence at the University of Oxford for several decades (p. 19) is to give unwarranted eminence to Bacon. It is surprising to read (p. 25) that because, *inter alia*, a sermon was written in Latin it was preached before Masters and Scholars. It is asserted (p. 28) that Kilwardby spent years at Oxford in close contact with Grosseteste and Bacon. I do not know of any such close contact. Kilwardby does not appear in any of Grosseteste's known correspondence. No evidence has been adduced to show that he was certainly in Oxford before 1235 when Grosseteste left Oxford to immerse himself in a very busy episcopate. The reader will again be surprised to find the author accepting (p. 36) the unsubstantiated tradition that Thomas Aquinas was present at the 1263 London meeting of the Dominican chapters. She assumees as a fact (p. 45) that Prince Edward turned to Kilwardby as Provincial of the Dominicans in 1268 for financial assistance. There is no evidence whatsoever for this assumption. The reviewer must object to this kind of history. The ascription of the letter from Kilwardby to the Bishop of Bath (p. 62) to the year 1276 seems more than dubious. Without any date, it exists only in a copy by Prynne. The heading, *Reverendo patri domino Bathon. suus Kilwardby*, does not give the impression of having been written by an archbishop to a bishop. The supposition that it was to William Button as a close friend does not help much. *Guillelmus* and *Robertus* might have been used, but even then the titles would have appeared. We miss a reference to F. M. Powicke's magistral *Medieval Books of Merton College* (Oxford, 1931) on p. 106 where Kilwardby's connection with the library at Merton is discussed. In accepting Pacham's account of Kilwardby's perhaps reprehensible mismanagement of the funds of the Leper Hospital and the Poor House (p. 111), it should be remembered that Pecham, a Franciscan, was talking about Kilwardby, a Dominican. We do not have Kilwardby's account of the matter. Migne's edition of John of Salisbury's *Metalogicon* is quoted (p. 132) instead of the greatly superior edition by C. C. J. Webb (Oxford, 1929). It is well known that the restrictions on the study of Aristotle at Paris went almost completely unenforced, and the state-

ment (p. 145) that they were already in force has no point. In the discussion of the *De Ortu Scienciarum* the reader would have appreciated more extensive quotations. There are insufficient suggestions as to possible sources. It would have been well, for instance, to compare pertinent sections of the *Summa de bono* of Philip the Chancellor, whose influence on Parisian thinking between 1210 and his death in 1236 would be difficult to exaggerate. The statement on p. 150 that Kilwardby "is said to have invented" the method of explicit chapter headings is hardly fair to Dr. Ludwig Baur who is quoted. Baur's statement in the introduction to his 1912 edition of some of Grosseteste's works (on p. 138*, not 137), is that Kilwardby was the first to introduce the habit of giving short summaries at the head of each chapter into English "Schriftstellerei." I do not believe the statement would be taken too seriously now. Throughout the chapter on Kilwardby's philosophical standing and the condemnations of Oxford the treatment suffers from the complete absence of any notice of his many other philosophical works. He is known to have written many commentaries on works of Aristotle, Boethius, Donatus and Priscian. The attempt to give a picture of Kilwardby the philosopher without any reference to the text of his specialized works is difficult to understand. The fact that these works are still in manuscript is no valid reason for not using them, and they are to be found in the places where the author has worked: Cambridge, London and the Vatican.

What the reader misses most of all and finds most difficult to excuse is a carefully documented list of the works of Kilwardby. This would not have been a difficult task to accomplish, given access to necessary catalogues and the large collections of MSS. to which SS has had access. Such a list of works and MSS. would have been a useful contribution and a foundation upon which further sound work could have been done. If it were only realized that spade work must be done first, much time and energy that now go into work that has later to be done over would be saved.

The proof-reading has been carelessly done. There is an average of at least one typographical error a page throughout the book, and the punctuation it at times quite unconventional. The index has perhaps been carelessly compiled, as a number of important references are not to be found in it.

In an Appendix of 23 pages SS prints a sermon found in Trinity

College Cambridge MS. 373, and fourteen letters, which are useful documents.

S. HARRISON THOMSON.

University of Colorado.

Sex Psychology in Education. By RUDOLPH ALLERS. Translated by Sidney A. Raemers, Ph. D. St. Louis and London: B. Herder Book Co., 1937. Pp. vii + 287.

Dr. Allers has well realized what he proposed as the sole aim of his book: "To establish fundamental principles and to lay general foundations." He rightly believes that sex education apart from general education is an impossibility (p. 32):

> Sex, as such cannot be educated; only as a whole being may the human person be molded by instruction. In training the mind, we are able to cultivate some of the individual functions of the intelligence. A child may be taught mathematics to the exclusion of everything else, or he may be trained to memorize without learning to reason or think clearly. The true aim of education, however, is to mold the individual as a whole.

Dr. Allers recognizes the importance of philosophy (pp. 276-277):

> To solve its own problems, education may turn to philosophy; but not to biology, medicine, psychology, or sociology. If we wish to remain on solid ground, we must adhere to philosophical guidance. The "educational crisis," about which we have heard so much, results from a desire on the part of education to free itself from its only support, philosophical anthropology, and hence from philosophy in general.

But Religion is of even greater importance (pp. 277-278):

> General education should mean that the human being is a unit composed of body and soul, that his task consists in contacting the material world, other human beings, truth, culture, and faith. As we see it, true education which disregards Religion is an impossibility. The principles of sex education are especially hard to establish without the aid of Religion. Only the thoughts of the commandments of God, the final meaning of human existence, and the value of sacrifice which is understood only through faith and seen fully only in the life of Christ, may convincingly answer the question of man's rebellious nature: Why should I do what I do not wish to do, and why should I not do what I wish to do?

The author is in full accord with what Pope Pius XI recognizes as the highest objective of Christian education, i. e., to lead the young to Christ (pp. 278-279):

Only in the light of the eternal truth can we see the things of the world and their true value. This is true of the part which sex plays in our lives. The aim of every education is to recognize the part played by every phase of the personality and to ordain our conduct according to this knowledge. The values of the personality are revealed when seen in their totality. They reach their height in the *Summum Bonum* and have their foundation in Him. But the Son first taught us to recognize the Father. Hence there is only one education: in Him and to Him.

In keeping with these principles, Dr. Allers recognizes the fact that psychology may not ignore its interconnections with other fields (pp. 57-58):

A psychology restricting itself to psychology would cease to be psychology. Hence a psychology of sex life must transcend its boundaries in both directions, namely, the realm of merely biological existence and the realm of love.

While the author made no attempt to present an exhaustive treatment of the many questions that might be included under "sex education," he touches on most phases of the complex problem: sex instruction, co-education, modesty, adolescence, autoeroticism, homesexuality, and preparation for matrimony.

Dr. Allers is well known as a critic of Freud and psychoanalysis generally. Throughout the present work he exposes the fallacies of Freud, but presents his most sweeping condemnation on page 199:

Psychoanalysis is purely materialistic and owes its existence to purely materialistic principles. An unbridgeable abyss separates psychoanalysis from every spiritual philosophy. Anyone who believes that the world is more than a combination of material elements cannot accept a single tenet of psychoanalysis. If we wish to educate our children in a Christian spirit, we must not allow ourselves to be influenced in any way by psychoanalytic opinions. A compromise between a spiritual view of the world and psychoanalysis is impossible. Only the person who fails to understand the existence of the one and the real meaning of the other can believe such a compromise possible.

In dealing with the sex differences in man and woman, the author fails to mention one essential difference of the sex instinct as found in man and woman and described as follows in Kirsch, *Sex Education and Training in Chastity* (p. 312):

The sexual instincts of young men are characteristically active, aggressive, spontaneous, and automatic, while those of women as a rule are passive and subject to awakening by external stimuli, especially in connection with affection. It is important that both the adolescent boy and girl should know of this difference in the two sexes. Briefly, it might be explained to

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them that love in the boy is chiefly physical, while in the girl it is chiefly psychic.

In his analysis of adolescence, Dr. Allers finds the consciousness of the ego basic, whereas American students of the subject regard the consciousness of manhood and womanhood as fundamental. We believe that the author will profit from a study of the American literature in the field. Now that Dr. Allers has assumed a professorship at the Catholic University of America, he will find it an easy matter to acquaint himself with this literature.

Dr. Raemers deserves credit for his smooth and faithful translation. He has even improved on the original by furnishing what was lacking in the German edition, an alphabetical index.

FELIX M. KIRSCH.

The Catholic University of America.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

We regret to chronicle the death of Father Albert O'Brien, O. F. M., Ph. D. He had been Professor of Philosophy at St. Bonaventure College; at the time of his death he was President of St. Francis Summer College. He was also President of the Catholic Library Association. He died on July 12 at Alburquerque, New Mexico. His death will be a source of grief to his many friends and to all who were looking forward to contributions that would be expected from his pen in the field of philosophy.

Rev. Philip S. Moore, C. S. C. announces "Publications in Mediaeval Studies" under his general editorship. The University of Notre Dame is sponsoring these studies. Father Moore has been a contributor to *The New Scholasticism*; holding a scholarship from the Catholic University, he worked for some years in Paris under the late Monsignor Lacombe.

The Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association are just off the press. They constitute Volume XIII of the Proceedings of the Association and deal with the general topic of Philosophy of Education. We are also happy to announce Volume One of the Philosophical Studies of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. These studies are planned as contributions of solid value to American thought. This first volume is A Study in Comparative Jurisprudence written by William F. Obering, S. J., Ph. D. Its title is *The Philosophy of Law of James Wilson*, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 1789-1798. Copies can be obtained from the Office of the Secretary of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C.

Looking back upon the very successful meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association December 29 and 30, 1937, J. McWilliams writes as follows in *The Modern Schoolman* for March 1938:

"TWO CULTURES

"On December 30th last in New York City one session of the American Catholic Philosophical Association was devoted to a joint meeting with the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division. The event, being the first of its kind, bids fair to become historic. Harvard,

Yale, Swarthmore, and St. Michael's of Toronto were represented in the readers of the papers and the leaders of the discussion. The topic was Monism as opposed to philosophical Dualism. In the midst of the greatest courtesy and manifest respect for the sincerity of opposing convictions, the two systems of philosophy appeared to be at opposite poles. Many Catholic students present were surprised to see the 'adversaries' of their textbooks appear in person on the speaker's stand and on the floor of the hall. The 'adversaries' were probably surprised that they had not yet smoked out the Scholastics from their age-old lairs.

"Both sides, it is safe to say, were given food for thought, for here were two distinct cultures locked in close encounter. Scholastics were told that every system of philosophy must rest on a set of postulates, and that the better system is the one whose postulates more effectively organize the factual knowledge that we all have. We were here presented with a system of learning which is not philosophy in our sense, but which is restricted to the methodology of the particular sciences. That such sciences, because they *are* particular, may legitimately begin by postulating theses that are established elsewhere in the realm of natural knowledge, Scholastics readily admit, but they will not concede that the ultimate of the sciences, philosophy, may do anything of the kind. We start, not with postulates, but with principles; with truths, that is, which are evident from the analysis of immediate experience. Far from being mere postulates, these truths are the most certain of all the things human reason may know, and they must be borne out at every step of our progress. If any conclusion drawn from them happens to transcend our immediate experience, that fact does not invalidate them, since all exploration must be expected to carry us into new regions. Let it be admitted that some mystery is encountered in all philosophy but if mystery is to mean the unknown, let the unknown be ahead of us, not the point from which we start.

"Monism is the inevitable outcome of a "philosophy," which, aping the methodology of the particular sciences, postulates that the world be explained by nothing but the world itself. Such a system does not only lead to the obscure, it begins with deliberate obscurantism."

CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTES

The Philosophical Review—Vol. XLVI, No. 5: September, 1937.

Albert G. A. Balz: *Cartesian Refutations of Spinoza*, I. Cartesianism endeavored to refute Spinozism by (1) showing the Spinoza single-substance doctrine to be materialistic and atheistic, and by (2) making a distinction between God and creature through Cartesian dualism. **Horace S. Fries:** *The Method of Proving Ethical Realism.* F. C. Sharp's investigations seem to bear out the idea that scientific methods are adequate to prove that moral judgments are objectively true or false in the same way that scientific judgments are true or false; and they seem to indicate the presence of a universal standard based on the idea that good consists in pleasure and should be allocated to the greatest number. **D. W. Gotshalk:** *The Metaphysical Situation.* The author proposes a triadic metaphysics based on the principles of substance, evolution, and integrative structure. **Herman Hausheer:** *St. Augustine's Conception of Time.* St. Augustine recognized the uniqueness and irreversibility of the temporal process and its organic finality. **John W. Blyth:** *On Mr. Hartshorne's Understanding of Whitehead's Philosophy.* The article shows the fallacies in Hartshorne's defense of Whitehead on the following four points: (1) the existence of secondary qualities in nature; (2) the extension of the category of feeling to all reality; (3) the non-existence of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" in Whitehead's philosophy; (4) the necessity of the unqualified inclusion of prehensions. **Justus Buchler:** *Art and Object in Locke.* The problem is whether perception and idea in Locke's philosophy are distinct or identical. **Roger W. Holmes:** *Two Jobs for the Logician?* The symbolization of propositions should include relations within relations and operations on terms and relations. **A. P. Ushenko:** *A Note on Universals.* The idea of any specific color necessitates universals. **J. D. Mabbott:** *Review of John Wild's "George Berkeley."* Wild traces the development of the transcendence-theory in Berkeley. **Victor Lowe:** *Review of C. E. M. Joad's "Return to Philosophy."* It has no philosophy. **George Morgan:** *Review of Karl Jaspers' "Nietzsche . . ."* Contains biography, philosophy, and synthesis.

The International Journal of Ethics—Vol. XLVIII, No. 1: October, 1937.

Hans Kelsen: *Aristotle and Hellenic-Macedonian Policy.* Aristotle's dualism in his Politics, Ethics and Metaphysics—that is: hereditary monarchy and moderate democracy; practical virtue of deeds and theoretical contemplative knowledge: monotheism and polytheism—should be viewed in consideration of Plato and of the political atmosphere of Macedonia and Athens during the time of Aristotle. **Harold A. Larrabee:** *Social Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Problems.* Ericksen gives a practical considera-

tion of a better social order, but lacks empirical data and theoretical clarity. **Dorothy M. Emmet:** *Bradley and Bergson: A Comparative Study.* Loomba gives a comparison of the metaphysical attitudes of Bradley and Bergson whose meeting-point is in the nature of metaphysical knowing and its distinction from the scientific intellect. **M. B. Singer:** *Hume's Theory of Knowledge: A Critical Examination.* In Hume's Epistemology there is a twofold skepticism with regard to inductive inference. **T. V. Smith:** *Ideology and Utopia.* All knowledge is relative to something other than its object. Social factors condition all human knowledge.

The Anglican Theological Review—Vol. IX, No. 4: October, 1937.

A. E. Taylor: *The Constant Element in Evangelism.* The basic moral standard should be such that it involves a conception firstly of what God has done and only secondly what we should do for God and our fellowmen.

The Modern Schoolman—Vol. XV, No. 1: November, 1937.

Jean LeBlond: *Cartesian Method and Classical Logic.* In this paper the author sets forth a few points of the disagreement between the Cartesian and Aristotelian conception of science tracing them back to their origin, that is, to the altogether different ideal which attracted each philosopher. **C. J. McNaspy:** *Augustine on Sensation.* In his handling of the problems of sense and sense-knowledge, St. Augustine answers the fundamental question of the relationship between soul and body. He precludes the entire problem and difficulties of species and intellectus agens. **James A. McWilliams:** *Dewey's Esthetic Experience.* Dewey maintains that all rules and principles are provisional and tentative. Experience is the interaction between the organism and environment. His realism thus reduces to pure phenomenalism. He tries to replace God by some vague, all-pervading, incomplete reality, which can be experienced only through esthetic emotionalism. **Philip H. Burkett:** *Is There a Common Ground in Sociology?* The writer, examining the question of whether there is both a non-Catholic and Catholic Sociology, concludes that there can be only one valid social science and that must be based on Christian principles. We cannot surrender our Catholic heritage of truth in the wide field of Sociology. **Leonard A. Waters:** *The Instrument of Order.* "Homo sapiens" can only be considered in relation to Sapientia. In this thesis, to cultivate a "philosophy" of man we must have an absolute, and a science of that Absolute by which to measure man. Knowledge of things by their ultimate causes is the true meaning of philosophy and is the highest activity of the human mind.

Journée d'Etudes de la Société Thomiste, III, Philosophie et Science, Louvain, September 24 and 25, 1935.

Among reports read at the convention were: that of **M. Augustin Mansion:** *La Physique Aristotélicienne et la Philosophie.* Science as clearly distinct from Philosophy did not exist for Aristotle. But the findings of

the different sciences he considered as proximate causes in his philosophical explanation of the world. The report of **M. Albert Michotte:** *Psychologie et Philosophie*, considers whether introspection can contribute to Experimental Psychology. After briefly reviewing some experiments made on the subject it is concluded that Experimental Psychology cannot be derived from study of mental content, or from factors of personality.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Adler, Mortimer J. *Art and Prudence.* New York-Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1937. Pp. xiv + 686.

A Group of His Students. *Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead.* New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1936. Pp. vii + 248.

Alexander, Hartley Burr. *God and Man's Destiny.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1936. Pp. vii + 235.

Anagnine, Eugenio. *G. Pico Della Mirandola Biblioteca di Cultura Moderna.* Bari Guis: Laterze & Figli Tipografi-Editori-Librai, 1937. Pp. vi + 277.

Barrett, James Francis. *This Creature Man.* Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1936. Pp. xvi + 364.

Belloc, Hilaire. *The Crisis of Civilization.* New York: Fordham University Press, 1937. Pp. 245.

Bochenski, Fr. I. M., O. P. *Elementa Logicae Graecae.* Roma: 1937. A. L. C. I. Anonima Libraria Cattolica Italiana. Pp. 122.

Borrelli, Pietro. *Contributi alla Storia della Filosofia.* Alessandria: Luigi Viscardi, 1937. Pp. xv +139.

Bremond, Henri. *Histoire Literaire du Sentiment Religieux en France.* Paris: Librairie Bloud et Gay, 1936. Pp. 256.

Brennan, Robert E., O. P. *General Psychology.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. Pp. xxxvii + 509.

Brunner, Rev. August, S. J. *Fundamental Questions of Philosophy.* St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1937. Pp. v + 350.

Burke, Thomas. *Truth and Beauty.* Boston: Bruce Humphries, Inc., 1937. Pp. viii + 63,

By a German Priest. Translated by Conrad M. R. Bonacina. *Peace and the Clergy.* New York: Sheed & Ward, 1936. Pp. xii + 166.

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IN SACRED MEMORY

OF

EDWARD ALOYSIUS PACE

Vice Rector and Professor Emeritus of Philosophy
The Catholic University of America

The death of Edward Aloysius Pace, Prothonotary Apostolic, has taken from American philosophy an effective and ardent student. His renunciation of a career as an experimental psychologist was a great gain for philosophy to which he devoted himself. THE NEW SCHOLASTICISM counts him as its co-founder. To him the American Catholic Philosophical Association owes much of the inspiration of its early days. A large proportion of its membership sat at his feet in the halls of philosophy at The Catholic University of America. His presence at its annual meetings until ill health made attendance impossible, was a leading factor in establishing its scientific position among learned societies. He may be called truly the herald of the Thomistic revival in the United States. Conservative, yet forward looking, he brought hidden truth to light, made the past known to the present, and opened wide the way of progress for the future. Philosophers everywhere will cherish his memory and mourn his departure.

May he rest in peace!

✠ JAMES HUGH RYAN
Bishop of Omaha